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FINANCIAL OPTIONS IN THE REAL WORLD: AN 
ECONOMIC AND TAX ANALYSIS 
DAVID HASEN*
ABSTRACT
Many of the consequences of issuing and purchasing options on publicly traded property 
have been well understood since Black and Scholes developed a model for option pricing. No 
model of options, however, provides an accurate economic analysis of the actual transactions 
that issuers and purchasers engage in when options are bought and sold. One consequence 
of this gap in understanding is that the rules for taxing options remain poorly developed. 
 This Article provides a transactional analysis of option sales for the first time. The focus 
is on covered options, but the analysis also has implications for options in which the under-
lying property serves merely as a reference obligation and is owned by neither party to the 
transaction. The analysis demonstrates that while all options have as one component a 
swap of variable risks or returns on the underlying property for a fixed payment, “in the 
money” options involve, in addition, a forward transfer of the benefits and correlative bur-
dens of a part of the underlying property that is equivalent to a forward sale of that part. 
Commentators have not identified this embedded forward sale because the payment ar-
rangement between the parties to the option transaction obscures it; however, a comparison 
of option prices derived under the Black-Scholes model with the theoretical prices of such 
forwards demonstrates that the transactions are identical. The analysis also illuminates the 
relationships between options and other common financial transactions, such as collars, 
and it permits a clear assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of possible tax rules 
for financial options. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION
 The treatment of options is a vexed area in the tax law. At its 
most basic, an option is a contract between two parties under which 
one of them purchases from the other the right, but not the obliga-
tion, to purchase or sell property (an “underlier”) at a fixed price (the 
“strike price”) on a particular date in the future (the “exercise date” 
or “strike date”).1 Long subject to “open-transaction” treatment, the 
sale of an option represents one of the few cases in which money can 
change hands in a commercial setting without triggering any imme-
diate income tax consequences.2 Instead, the grantor of an option typ-
ically includes nothing in income on receipt of payment for the option 
(the “option premium”), while the option purchaser is entitled neither 
to an immediate deduction of the option premium3 nor to amortize 
the premium prior to the exercise date.4 Further, unless it is highly 
likely on the option sale date that the option will be exercised,5 no 
sale of the underlier is deemed to have occurred for tax purposes on 
sale of the option, even though, in economic terms, the option sale is 
often similar to a partial sale of the underlier. Instead, tax conse-
quences first arise when something further happens in respect of the 
option, such as its exercise,6 lapse, cancellation, or disposition.7
                                                                                                                    
 1. JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES, AND OTHER DERIVATIVES 179-184 (7th ed. 
2009).  
 2. See Va. Iron Coal & Coke Co. v. Comm’r, 99 F.2d 919, 921-22 (4th Cir. 1938); see 
also Rev. Rul. 78-182, 1978-1 C. B. 265; 26 U.S.C. § 1234 (2006). The other major exception 
to the taxation of cash on receipt rule is the nontaxation of loan proceeds. Cases in which a 
non-cash exchange of property for property goes untaxed are more common. They include 
exchanges of certain like-kind properties, 26 U.S.C. § 1031, and the contribution of proper-
ty to a controlled corporation in exchange for the corporation’s stock, 26 U.S.C. § 351(a), or 
to a partnership in exchange for an interest in the partnership. 26 U.S.C. § 721. 
 3. Rev. Rul. 78-182, 1978-1 C.B. 265. 
 4. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.263(a)-(4)(c)(1)(iii)(E).  
 5. Rev. Rul. 80-238, 1980-2 C.B. 96. 
 6. Rev. Rul. 78-182, 1978-1 C.B.265 . 
 7. 26 U.S.C. § 1234A.  
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 Most commentators view this regime as incorrect,8 but beyond 
that partial consensus little agreement exists on how the tax law 
should apply to options. Options have been variously described as, or 
as analogous to, services transactions,9 carved-out property inter-
ests,10 partnerships,11 amounts received under a claim of right,12 in-
stances of “dynamic hedging,”13 and wagers.14 Each of these characte-
rizations would theoretically support a different set of rules for op-
tion taxation. Each has virtues, but none is fully satisfactory. For ex-
ample, under the carved-out interest approach, the option sale would 
be viewed as its own complete disposition of a contingent property in-
terest, regardless of whether the option was exercised. This approach 
has intuitive appeal for call options, which give the option purchaser 
the right to buy property, but in the case of a put option, where the 
option purchaser acquires the right to dispose of the underlier, it is 
difficult to see how the disposition on the option sale date of what ap-
pears to be a potential liability counts as a property transaction. Si-
milarly, under a claim of right analysis, the option premium might be 
viewed not as part of a property transaction, but as a separate trans-
action creating income for the option grantor because the premium is 
not subject to limitation on its use by the recipient.15 Under such an 
analysis, the premium would be immediately includible in income, 
though possibly subject to adjustment later on. Immediate inclusion 
seems to be a sensible result, except that amounts received on condi-
tion of providing a service or subject to a future obligation generally 
are not treated as received under a claim of right,16 though they 
might be taxable on other grounds.17 Further, where the option is 
“deep in the money” and so highly likely to be exercised, the option 
sale appears to be more analogous to a forward sale of the underlier 
                                                                                                                    
 8. See, e.g., Eric D. Chason, Naked and Covered in Monte Carlo: A Reappraisal of Op-
tion Taxation, 27 VA. TAX REV. 135, 138-39 (2007); Noël B. Cunningham & Deborah H. 
Schenk, Taxation Without Realization: A “Revolutionary” Approach to Ownership, 47 TAX 
L. REV. 725, 775-76 (1992); Calvin H. Johnson, Taxing the Income from Writing Options, 96 
TAX NOTES TODAY 201-54 (1996); Yoram Keinan, United States Federal Taxation of Deriva-
tives: One Way or Many?, 61 TAX LAW. 81, 146-57 (2007). But see Kevin J. Liss, Rationaliz-
ing the Taxation of Options in the Age of Derivatives, 61 TAX LAW. 855, 856 (2008) (arguing 
that holding option transactions open for tax purposes until exercise, lapse, disposition or 
cancellation is correct). 
 9. Johnson, supra note 8, at 6. 
 10. Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 8, at 780-81. 
 11. Bruce Kayle, Realization Without Taxation? The Not-So-Clear Reflection of Income 
From an Option to Acquire Property, 48 TAX L. REV. 233, 277 (1993). 
 12. Id. at 248-54. 
 13. David M. Hasen, A Realization-Based Approach to the Taxation of Financial In-
struments, 57 TAX L. REV. 397, 429-49 (2004). 
 14. Liss, supra note 8, at 856-57. 
 15. N. Am. Oil Consol. v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417, 424 (1932). 
 16. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 58-234, 1958-1 C.B. 279. 
 17. See, e.g., Schlude v. Comm’r, 372 U.S. 128, 133-37 (1962) (requiring an accrual-
method taxpayer to include sums paid for dance lessons to be provided in the future). 
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than to a payment subject to a claim of right. Comparable difficulties 
arise under the remaining characterizations mentioned above. 
 Prior to the advent of modern financial products, the failure of the 
tax law to tax options correctly (for those who so view the current 
rules) amounted to little more than an irritation. Options were rela-
tively uncommon, tended to be short-lived, and typically were not en-
tered into for tax avoidance purposes.18 In short, even if options were 
wrongly taxed, not much hung in the balance. This relatively tolera-
ble state of affairs no longer holds. Modern financial products have 
rendered options ubiquitous,19 have made the choice to purchase or 
sell them depend in many cases solely upon tax considerations, and 
have extended the terms of many options to economically significant 
periods.20 At least three significant problems in option taxation have 
emerged as a consequence. First, under the current regime, a large 
class of taxpayers is taxed incorrectly in ways that are economically 
significant, simply because the option premium goes untaxed for a 
significant period of time. Second, because the open transaction doc-
trine differs so dramatically from the accrual or accrual-type regimes 
commonly applied to other, similar financial instruments,21 taxpayers 
can elect their tax treatment at little if any economic cost. For exam-
ple, a taxpayer seeking an immediate deduction for an option-like 
premium can enter into an economically similar notional principal 
contract that permits deduction of the option premium-like payment 
over time, whereas the same taxpayer can purchase a conventional 
and economically similar option if deferral of the deduction is prefer-
able. Third, and in a related vein, taxpayers can opt into tax arbi-
trage without much difficulty through the expedient of entering into 
arrangements that largely offset for economic purposes but not for 
tax purposes. Amplifying on the previous example, a taxpayer might 
purchase an option-like notional principal contract that generates 
current deductions while selling an economically similar option in re-
turn for an option premium that is not taxed in the current period. 
 Added to these difficulties is the fact that much of the justification 
for the wait-and-see regime under the open transaction doctrine does 
not carry over to financial options anyway. Formerly, option purchas-
es tended to be associated with transactions in unique underlying 
                                                                                                                    
 18. See generally Tony Ware, Financial Derivatives—A Brief Introduction, MITACS 
6th Annual Conference, May 11, 2005, available at http://finance.math.ucalgary.ca/papers/ 
MitacsShortCourse2005.pdf. 
 19. See generally id.
 20. See, e.g., 26 C.F.R. § 1.446-3(f)(3) (addressing the tax consequences of options em-
bedded in notional principal contracts having a multi-period life). 
 21. In addition to CPDIs, the following instruments are subject to accrual or accrual-
type taxation: notional principal contracts, 26 C.F.R. § 1.446-3, original issue debt instru-
ments, 26 U.S.C. § 1272, “dealer” property, 26 U.S.C. § 475, certain foreign currency con-
tracts, 26 U.S.C. § 988. 
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property,22 and as a consequence the establishment of a financial 
equivalent for the option would be difficult if not impossible. In the 
typical case, the reason for the option purchase was that at or near 
the time of potential purchase of the underlier, some question existed 
about whether the purchaser wanted or would be able to acquire or 
retain it.23 That decision may not have depended upon objective, rea-
dily observable financial information, but on imponderables such as 
whether the particular underlier in question best satisfied the pur-
chaser’s personal or business needs or whether financing for the pur-
chase of the underlier would be available.24 An individual might be 
willing to buy an antique dresser as long as nothing better was of-
fered at the flea market; Blackacre might suit a farmer’s plans to ex-
pand operations, but the availability of a bank loan could be uncer-
tain on the day the property is offered for sale. The purchase of a call 
option in either case would enable the prospective buyer to resolve 
these contingencies in exchange for a fee. However, quantifying the 
economic effect of paying the fee—the premium paid for the option—
to either party in such a situation is a difficult if not impossible task. 
In particular, it typically will not be possible to establish a readily 
observable value for an option of that kind. 
 By contrast, modern financial options typically are written on 
fungible property, which means that information about the true val-
ue of the option is readily available.25 Unlike Blackacre and Whitea-
cre, there is no material difference between an option on share A of 
IBM stock and one with the same terms on share B because there is 
no difference in the shares. Consequently, the economic characteris-
tics of the derivative financial option are readily ascertainable, and 
worries about mistaxation if valuation occurs on the option purchase 
date are largely absent. 
 These two general phenomena—the failure of the tax law to reach 
appropriate rules for the taxation of financial options and the col-
lapse of the practical justifications for applying the open transaction 
doctrine to such options—indicate that much is to be gained from an 
analysis of financial options that can disclose their actual economics 
and explicate how a realization-based income tax should apply to 
them. This Article seeks to accomplish these goals through an appli-
cation of standard and well-understood concepts in the tax law, in-
formed by the Black-Scholes model of option pricing. The primary fo-
cus here is so-called “covered options,” or options in which one of the 
parties owns the property that is subject to the option. However, the 
                                                                                                                    
 22. See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 175-79 (4th ed. 2004). 
 23. See id.
 24. See generally ROBERT F. BRUNER, APPLIED MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 425 (2004). 
 25. Thomas A. Smith, The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A Neotraditional Inter-
pretation of Fiduciary Duty, 98 MICH. L. REV. 214, 258-59 (1999). 
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analysis also has ramifications for the tax analysis of options that are 
mere bilateral contracts because the payout structure of such con-
tracts is the same as that of a covered option. Consequently, the two 
types of transactions often are close substitutes for each other. To 
give a sense of the tax stakes involved, consider that millions of op-
tions contracts having a combined value of several billions of dollars 
are traded daily in the United States alone.26
 Under the analysis developed here, the purchase of an option is 
properly viewed as consisting of the cashing out of a possible gain or 
loss, together with (in the case of “in the money” options) a forward 
property transaction, where the term property is understood in its 
standard tax sense of ownership of the economic benefits and correla-
tive burdens associated with an asset or part of an asset.27 Critically, 
this analysis applies equally to put and call options, despite the ap-
parent incongruity of treating the off-loading of risk in the case of the 
purchase of a put option as a property disposition. The basic teaching 
is that true “option” arrangements arise only to the extent that op-
tions are exchanges of fixed for uncertain returns or risks. The bal-
ance of any option transaction—that is, the portion that is “in the 
money” on the option sale date—is a property transaction. In this 
transaction, the opportunity for gain and the risk of loss that strad-
dle the expected value of the underlier on the exercise date are trans-
ferred to the party that would formally purchase the underlier (or its 
equivalent) on exercise. The fact that in the money options constitute 
transfers of risks and correlative burdens explains how options shade 
into simple forward contracts as they move deeper into the money on 
the option sale date. 
 So understood, it becomes possible to formulate rules for the taxa-
tion of options that respect the lines that exist between the types of 
returns options generate. On one hand, out-of-the-money options are 
closely akin to the purchase of a service that should be taxed as ordi-
nary income to the option writer, but on the other hand, certain op-
tions have property disposition-like characteristics. Without an un-
derstanding of how the risk-shifting part of any option shades into 
the property-shifting part of some options, it has not been possible to 
formulate tax rules that are consistent with both of these aspects of 
options. Further, the understanding of options developed in this Ar-
ticle makes it possible to devise rules that are consistent with prin-
ciples that have long operated in the tax system, particularly the fol-
lowing two: 1) that the taxpayer does not realize the gain or loss as-
                                                                                                                    
 26. In 2008, nearly 1.2 billion options having a total cash value of nearly $1 trillion 
were traded on the Chicago Board Options Exchange. See Chicago Board Options Ex-
change, CBOE 2008 Market Statistics, at 1, available at http://www.cboe.com/Data/ 
marketstats-2008.pdf (last visited Aug. 27, 2010). 
 27. See Grodt & McKay Realty, Inc. v. Comm’r, 77 T.C. 1221, 1243-45 (1981). 
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sociated with an asset until the asset is disposed of (known as the 
“realization rule”), and 2) that capital income is taxed differently 
from ordinary income.28 While the analysis here does not decisively 
point to any particular tax regime for options, it suggests that certain 
approaches will be more effective and appropriate than others, and it 
illustrates the extent to which differing approaches involve, and do 
not involve, legitimate trade-offs. The analysis also helps to explain 
the flaws in the current law as well as the strengths and weaknesses 
of others’ suggestions for the taxation of options. 
 The approach developed here has eluded commentators because 
they typically have not focused on the entire stream of payments in 
an option transaction. Instead, commentators have tended to sepa-
rate the option purchase from the option payout (or lapse), focusing 
on the rights delivered on exercise of the option separately from those 
involved in the payment of the option premium itself. Stated other-
wise, they have let the optics of option transactions drive their ana-
lyses. However, once the total sequence of payments in an option 
transaction is taken into account, the property transaction inherent 
in any in the money option becomes manifest. The portion, if any, of 
the option premium that is economically attributable to the in the 
money aspect of the option is nothing more than a shift in the timing 
of the payouts from ownership of a part of the underlier. 
 Part II reviews the basic law for the taxation of options. Part III 
offers a novel analysis that aspires both to explain the economics of 
an option transaction and to clarify the ways in which options are 
similar to, but distinct from, the various instruments and arrange-
ments to which others have compared them. The analysis in Part III 
relies heavily on the Black-Scholes option pricing model, but it elabo-
rates significantly on the model in its explanation of the on-the-
ground facts that correspond to the results produced under the mod-
el. Part IV sets forth possible tax rules for options in light of the eco-
nomic analysis of options developed in Part III. 
II.   OPTION BASICS
A.   Options Generally 
 Options come in two basic forms.29 A call option, or “call,” gives the 
owner of the option the right but not the obligation to purchase a giv-
en item of property at a given price on one or more dates in the fu-
ture. A put option, or “put,” gives the owner the right but not the ob-
ligation to sell a given item of property at a given price on one or 
                                                                                                                    
 28. See 26 U.S.C. § 1(h) (2006) (discussing favorable rates for long-term capital gain of in-
dividuals); 26 U.S.C. § 1001 (discussing gain or loss on property generally taxed when realized). 
 29. See generally HULL, supra note 1, at 179-84. 
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more dates in the future. In standard parlance, a call option is said to 
be “in the money” (“ITM”) at any time that the fair market value of 
the underlier exceeds the option exercise price; “at the money” 
(“ATM”) if the fair market value equals the exercise price; and “out of 
the money” (“OTM”) at any time that the fair market value is less 
than the exercise price. Similarly, a put is ITM if the value of the un-
derlier is less than the exercise price, ATM if the values are equal, 
and OTM otherwise. Thus, an option will not be exercised if it is 
OTM on the exercise date. 
 The following example demonstrates these concepts. 
Simple call option: On Day 1, A pays $Y to B in exchange 
for an option to purchase 100 shares of XYZ Company stock 
from B at $X on Day 2, one year later. 
If the fair market value of 100 shares of XYZ stock on Day 2 exceeds 
$X, the option will be ITM, and A will exercise the option; otherwise, 
the option will lapse unexercised.30 If the option provided A the right 
to sell, rather than to buy, 100 shares of XYZ stock, the option would 
be a put and A would exercise only if the fair market value of the 
XYZ stock were not greater than $X on Day 2. 
 Options that may be exercised on just one date are referred to as 
European options, while options exercisable on more than one date 
are referred to as American options.31 Options also may be either 
physically settled or cash settled. A physically settled option requires 
the purchase or sale of the underlier to occur if the option is exer-
cised, while a cash settled option is exercised through the option 
writer’s transfer of the net option value to the option holder on the 
exercise date. In the previous examples, a physical settlement of ei-
ther option would require the option holder to tender, in the case of 
the call, $X to the option writer on Day 2 in order to receive the stock, 
or in the case of the put, the underlying XYZ stock in order to receive 
$X. If, by contrast, the options were cash-settled, then the holder of 
the option would be entitled to a cash payment equal to the difference 
between the fair market value of the stock and $X in the case of the 
call, or between $X and the fair market value of the stock in the case 
of the put. Thus, as contrasted with a physically settled option, nei-
ther party to a cash settled option need own the underlier at any 
time. Where the underliers are fungible, publicly traded property 
                                                                                                                    
 30. For ease of exposition. I disregard the case where the option is ATM on the exer-
cise date. In that case, it is a matter of indifference whether the option is exercised or not. 
 31. HULL, supra note 1, at 179-81. 
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such as publicly traded stock, commodities, or futures, the difference 
between cash and physical settlement often approaches nil.32
 Lastly, options may be contingent in the sense that some condition 
beyond the option’s being ITM on the exercise date must be satisfied 
in order for the option to be exercisable. In a now common product 
known as a credit default swap (a “CDS”), the writer of the swap may 
promise to pay for the decline in value of an underlier on one or more 
dates, but only when the decline is due to some factor other than 
changes to general market conditions.33 In economic terms, a CDS of 
this type is economically equivalent to a contingent put option. Most 
forms of insurance also are economically equivalent to contingent put 
options, as long as the purchaser of the insurance has an insurable 
interest in the underlier.34
B.   Tax Rules 
 A welter of rules governs the taxation of options. Some of the  
rules are statutory, some are administrative, and some derive from 
decisional law. 
1.   Options Not Subject to Special Rules 
 The open transaction doctrine applies to options not subject to a 
special statutory regime.35 The doctrine itself dates from the 1931 
Supreme Court case Burnet v. Logan,36 which did not deal with op-
tions but with contingent payment rights. In Logan, the taxpayer 
sold an interest in a mining company and received payment in the 
form of cash plus rights to a percentage of future mine earnings over 
an indefinite period. The Court held that the taxpayer was entitled to 
recover her basis in the property sold before reporting any of the 
payment for her mining stock as gain from the transaction because 
the uncertainty inherent in the timing and amount of future payouts 
                                                                                                                    
 32. Even where the option is on a commodity such as wheat, physical settlement 
commonly occurs in connection with the separate transfer of the underlier to a person in 
the trade or business of selling the underlier. Id. at 10. 
 33. As its name implies, the associated trigger is generally a default of some kind by 
the issuer on the reference obligation, or else some similar event such as a downgrade in 
the creditworthiness of the issuer of the underlier. See Roberto Blanco et al., An Empirical 
Analysis of the Dynamic Relation Between Investment-Grade Bonds and Credit Default 
Swaps, 60 J. FIN. 2255, 2256 (2005). 
 34. As a simple example, homeowner’s insurance is equivalent to a put option on the 
home with a strike price equal to the fair market value of the home (or its insured amount, 
whichever is less) where the decline in value is due to certain events, such as a fire or a 
flood. True insurance relationships also generally require the option holder to have an in-
surable interest in the underlier. Bertram Harnett & John V. Thornton, Insurable Interest 
in Property: A Socio-Economic Reevaluation of a Legal Concept, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 1162, 
1162-63 (1948). 
 35. See Va. Iron Coal & Coke Co. v. Comm’r, 99 F.2d 919, 921-22 (4th Cir. 1938). 
 36. Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404, 413-14 (1931). 
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made taxation inappropriate, given that the consequences of the sale 
would be determined with certainty in subsequent periods. 
 In Virginia Iron Coal & Coke Co. v. Commissioner,37 the open 
transaction rule was extended to options at the behest of the gov-
ernment. The taxpayer received payments over a three-year period 
for an option it had sold to a third party that provided the third party 
the right to purchase stock or mineral lands. When the option holder 
let the option lapse in 1934, the taxpayer filed amended returns for 
the years in which it had received payments, treating the amounts 
received as ordinary income in those years.38 The government argued, 
and the court agreed, that the open transaction doctrine applied be-
cause at the time the payments were received “it was impossible to 
determine whether they were taxable or not” and, because the nature 
of option payments received in a particular year might first become 
ascertainable after the statute of limitations had closed for that year, 
only a rule that the taxable event occurred in the year of lapse or ex-
ercise would be administrable.39
 Although the problem of uncertainty lingering beyond the statute 
of limitations motivated the decision in Virginia Iron, the kind of un-
certainty that commonly has been considered to justify application of 
the open transaction doctrine is that of character of the option pre-
mium.40 If the option purchaser exercises its right to buy or sell under 
the option, a transfer of property will occur, and it would seem that 
the tax consequences attending a property disposition should also 
apply to the option sale. That is, the two transactions together ap-
pear to constitute a single property disposition and should be so 
treated for tax purposes.41 If, however, the option goes unexercised, 
then at least in a formal sense no property changes hands, and the 
tax consequences of the option sale would seem to differ too, assum-
ing that the tax consequences of nonproperty transactions generally 
differ from those of property transactions. Accordingly, because it is 
not possible to get the “right” answer with any certainty on the op-
tion sale date, it is better to hold the transaction open – that is, to 
wait and see.42
 Although subsequent developments, both administrative and leg-
islative, have substantially narrowed the scope of application of the 
open transaction doctrine,43 the doctrine’s basic rationale—
                                                                                                                    
 37. 99 F.2d at 921. 
 38. Id. at 919-21. 
 39. Id. at 921-22. 
 40. See Rev. Rul. 78-182, 1978-1 C.B. 265. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See Burnet, 283 U.S. at 413, (articulating the justification for the open transaction 
doctrine, albeit in a nonoption setting);Va. Iron Coal & Coke Co., 99 F.2d at 919 (extending 
the rationale to options). 
 43. See, e.g., Temp. Reg. § 15A.453-1(d)(2)(iii). 
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uncertainty in the tax consequences of a transaction in the taxable 
period—continues to serve as the basis for the tax treatment of most 
options.44 Accordingly, under current practice for options not subject 
to special rules, receipt of the option premium is a nontaxable 
event.45 If the option is exercised, the option writer treats the pre-
mium as part of the amount realized in the case of a call and as a re-
duction in the purchase price in the case of a put. The holder treats 
the premium symmetrically, adding the premium to basis in the case 
of a call and subtracting the premium from the amount realized in 
the case of a put.46 Under the sample transaction above, on exercise 
of the call, B would treat $X + $Y as the amount received as payment 
for the XYZ stock, and A’s basis in the stock would be the same 
amount. If the option were a put, then A’s amount realized and B’s 
amount paid would be $X - $Y. The character of any gain or loss rec-
ognized is generally the same as that of the underlier in the hands of 
the seller of the property.47
 When an option is not exercised, or is disposed of in some way prior 
to its possible exercise, different rules apply to holders and writers of 
options. Holders are generally subject to the rules of § 1234(a), which 
provide that gain or loss to the option holder on disposition (including 
lapse)48 of the option has the character as short- or long-term capital 
that the underlier does or would have in the holder’s hands. If, howev-
er, the underlier is or would be inventory or not otherwise a capital as-
set in the holder’s hands, gain or loss generally will be ordinary.49 The 
same rules apply where the option is cancelled by mutual agreement of 
the parties (with or without a cancellation payment).50
 Writers of options are generally subject to the rules of § 1234(b) when 
the option is not (or not yet) exercised. In the case of an option on stock, 
securities, or commodities, the disposition, lapse, or cancellation of the 
option generally will produce short-term capital gain or loss, unless the 
underlier is not a capital asset in the holder’s hands or the option is 
granted in the ordinary course of the taxpayer’s trade or business of 
granting options, in either of which cases gain or loss is ordinary.51
                                                                                                                    
 44. Rev. Rul. 78-182, 1978-1 C.B. 265. 
 45. Id.
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. 26 U.S.C. § 1234(a)(2) (2006). 
 49. See 26 U.S.C. § 1222 (defining capital gain or loss as gain or loss from the sale or 
exchange of a capital asset). 
 50. 26 U.S.C. § 1234A. 
 51. See Rev. Rul. 78-182, 1978-1 C.B. 265; 26 U.S.C. § 1234A. 
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2.   Special Situations 
 The rules described above do not apply to a variety of options and 
persons. Most importantly, under § 475, mark-to-market rules apply 
to taxpayers who are either (1) dealers in options,52 or (2) traders in 
options who elect to have mark-to-market rules apply to income and 
loss from their option transactions, regardless of the nature of the 
underlier.53 Under the mark-to-market rules, dealers and electing 
traders value, or mark to market, their inventory annually and either 
pay tax on the net increase in value of the inventory or take a deduc-
tion for the net decrease over the previous year. Gain or loss is ordi-
nary in character.54 In the case of a dealer in options, the mark-to-
market regime means that while open transaction treatment still ap-
plies when the option is entered into, the tax system will take into 
account the appreciation or decline in value of the option during the 
year. Persons in the trade or business of writing options generally 
treat option premiums as ordinary income, but again subject to de-
ferral under the open transaction doctrine.55
 The rules described in Section II.B.1 also do not apply in a number 
of special situations. First, they do not govern options on “section 
1256 contracts.”56 Section 1256 contracts comprise a variety of public-
ly traded financial contracts, most of which are valued on a daily ba-
sis by the exchanges on which they are traded.57 Like options held as 
inventory or by dealers in securities, section 1256 contracts (some of 
which are themselves options), and options on them are subject to a 
mark-to-market regime,58 but unlike inventory or dealer property, § 
1256 mandates that gain and loss on section 1256 contracts be 40% 
short-term capital and 60% long-term capital in character.59
 Second, holders of nonexercised put options entered into in con-
nection with certain short sales are subject to § 1233.60 In a short 
sale, one party borrows property that it then sells to a purchaser. The 
seller later “closes out” the short sale by delivering to the lender 
                                                                                                                    
 52. Taxpayers who are dealers in securities may hold securities, including options, as 
inventory or not. Subject to limited exceptions, if held as inventory, the option is generally 
subject to inventory accounting. See 26 U.S.C. § 475(b) (2006); see also 26 U.S.C. § 475(a)(1) 
(requiring annual fair market valuation of the option). If the option is not held as invento-
ry, essentially the same MTM rules apply. See 26 U.S.C. § 475(a)(2). 
 53. 26 U.S.C. § 475(f). 
 54. See 26 U.S.C. § 1221(a)(1) (excluding inventory from the definition of “capital as-
set” and therefore from capital treatment on sale or exchange). 
 55. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 78-46-059 (Aug. 18, 1978) (treating income from op-
tion premiums in the case of a person in the trade or business of granting options). 
 56. 26 U.S.C. § 1234(c)(1). Certain options are themselves “section 1256 contracts.” See
26 U.S.C. § 1256(b)(3)-(4). These too, of course, are subject to the general rules of § 1256. 
 57. 26 U.S.C. § 1256(g)(4)-(6). 
 58. 26 U.S.C. § 1256(a)(1). 
 59. 26 U.S.C. § 1256(a)(3). 
 60. 26 U.S.C. § 1234(a)(3)(c). 
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property identical to the property borrowed. Section 1234(a)(3) pro-
vides that the rules of § 1233(c) apply to losses resulting from the 
nonexercise of put options described in that section. Section 1233(c) 
in turn states that if the taxpayer acquires a put option to sell prop-
erty on the same date it acquires the property to which the option, if 
exercised, will apply, then any loss on the nonexercise of the option is 
added to the basis of the property so acquired. 
 Lastly, the general rules may not apply to situations in which the 
option is embedded in another instrument or is treated as part of 
another arrangement. Examples of the first situation include the 
previously discussed case of an option embedded in an NPC as well 
as options embedded in contingent payment debt instruments. For 
these instruments, the option premium is generally accounted for 
over the term of the instrument on the basis of assumptions about 
the returns the option will generate. Any disparity between the pro-
jections and the actual returns is accounted for either periodically or 
at term. Examples of explicit integration or quasi-integration regimes 
include options entered into as hedges,61 as parts of a straddle,62 or in 
connection with a wash sale.63 In these cases, the tax treatment of 
the option depends in some way on the treatment of the asset or in-
strument with which it is associated. 
C.   Problems in Option Taxation 
 This Subpart identifies some of the difficulties that options pose to 
the tax system. The discussion involves variations on the following 
basic fact pattern: 
Suppose A is the owner of 100 shares of XYZ stock, which 
does not pay dividends. On Day 1, A and B enter into an op-
tion transaction pursuant to which the option, if exercised, 
will result in the transfer of the XYZ stock to B on Day 2, 
one year later. The stock is worth $100 on Day 1, and A’s ad-
justed basis in the stock is $10. As of Day 1, A has held the 
XYZ stock for more than one year. XYZ stock has moderate 
volatility of 30%. In the case of a call option, A will be the 
seller of the option and B the buyer, while in the case of a 
put, these roles will be reversed. At all times, the risk-free 
rate of return is 10%. Neither A nor B is a trader or dealer 
in stock or options. 
 Throughout this discussion, the terms ATM, ITM and OTM are 
defined relative to the forward price of the underlier on the exercise 
                                                                                                                    
 61. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.446-4. 
 62. See § 1092. 
 63. See § 1091. 
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date, as determined on the option sale date. This usage differs from 
standard usage, which defines the terms relative to the value of the 
underlier on the date the determination (as ATM, ITM or OTM) is 
made. Further, interest is assumed to accrue on a continuously com-
pounded basis rather than periodically. For example, under an as-
sumed rate of 10% compounded continuously, property worth $100 on 
Day 1 would have a forward price of $110.52 on Day 2, one year lat-
er.64 The assumption of continuous compounding is made to simplify 
the analysis because the Black-Scholes model of option pricing on 
which the analysis rests assumes continuous compounding. The 
analysis here would hold if Black-Scholes were modified to assume 
periodic compounding, but it is easier to hold Black-Scholes constant 
and to assume continuous compounding rather than to hold constant 
the assumption that interest compounds periodically and modify 
Black-Scholes. Under these parameters, a call option sold on the 
property on Day 1 having an exercise date of Day 2 would be ATM if 
the strike price is $110.52, OTM if it is above $110.52, and ITM if it 
is less than $110.52. For a put option, the ITM and OTM designa-
tions would be reversed. 
1.    Basic Call Option 
 Consider first an ATM call option that A sells to B. Since the risk-
free rate is 10%, an ATM option will have a strike price of $110.52. It 
would sell for $11.92.65 Under the open transaction doctrine, A does 
not take the $11.92 into income on Day 1 but instead waits until 
something further happens. In the meantime, A can invest the pre-
mium. While investment earnings would be subject to tax, the ex-
emption of the principal from tax is equivalent to taxing the premium 
but exempting the yield on it.66 In other words, it is equivalent to 
consumption taxation of the premium.67 The nondeductibility of the 
premium to B may provide some comfort from a tax revenue perspec-
tive, but the fact remains that on an individual basis, the parties are 
not properly taxed.68 And if the parties are not subject to the same 
marginal rates, revenue neutrality also is not preserved. This last 
                                                                                                                    
 64. The general formula for continuous compounding is: A = Pert, where A is the 
amount, P is the initial principal, r is the rate expressed as a decimal, and t is the number 
of years.  
 65. The pricing is based on the Black-Scholes theorem and can be derived using a 
Black-Scholes pricing calculator, many of which are available online. See, e.g., The Deriva-
tives ‘Zine, http://www.margrabe.com/OptionPricing.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2010). 
 66. Cary Brown, Business-Income Taxation and Investment Incentives, in INCOME,
EMPLOYMENT, AND PUBLIC POLICY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ALVIN H. HANSEN 300, 301 (1948). 
 67. Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption 
Tax Over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1413 (2006). 
 68. One can view the overall arrangement as a kind of surrogate taxation. 
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problem may be particularly acute where B is a non-U.S. person not 
subject to U.S. tax generally. 
 The fact that A acquires an investment opportunity suggests that 
there is an exchange in the transaction because parties dealing at 
arm’s length do not exchange value for nothing. The fact that no 
payment occurs on the option sale date suggests further that the 
transaction contains a loan of some sort. In short, if parties dealing 
at arm’s length do not provide something for nothing, the investment 
opportunity that A acquires will have been paid for.69 Therefore, the 
absence of explicit interest indicates that the price of the option is 
discounted.70 B pays an amount for the option that reflects the for-
gone opportunity to earn a return on the premium during the year 
prior to exercise. Stated otherwise, $11.92 represents the discounted 
present value of the option premium on Day 2. Under the assumed 
10% risk-free rate of return, if the option premium were due on that 
day (regardless of exercise), B would pay $13.17. This analysis sug-
gests that interest should be deemed to accrue on the premium for 
tax purposes, with a corresponding deduction to A.
 The failure to tax the interest on the premium is not the only 
troubling feature of the option sale.71 Considering the possible out-
comes of the transaction, it seems clear that on Day 1, A has locked 
in gain no matter what happens. On that day, A receives $11.92. If 
the option is exercised, A will receive an additional $110.52 on Day 2, 
for a total of $122.44, in exchange for the stock. A’s taxable gain will 
be $112.44. If the option is not exercised, A gets to keep the $11.92, 
again fully taxable, without parting with the stock. It is therefore un-
clear why A should not be taxed in some fashion on the $11.92 on re-
ceipt (with, under current law, a corresponding basis adjustment). 
The justification for open transaction treatment would not seem to 
apply in this instance, since it is known on Day 1 that there will be 
income and that under current law it is capital in nature. Although, 
under current law, it is not known on Day 1 whether the gain will be 
short-term or long-term,72 the justification for short-term gain to op-
tion writers in the nonexercise case is not that such gain is “inher-
ently” short-term, but that grantors will manipulate the timing of 
capital gains if the character of the gain depends on the holding pe-
                                                                                                                    
 69. William A. Klein, Tailor to the Emperor With No Clothes: The Supreme Court's 
Tax Rules for Deposits and Advance Payments, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1685, 1695 (1994) (“From 
an economic perspective there are no interest-free loans, only hidden, or imputed, interest. 
The hidden interest . . . is always there.”). 
 70. See id.
 71. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 4-8 (criticizing the failure to tax interest on the premium). 
 72. If the option lapses, the premium is considered short-term capital gain under 
§1234(b). If the option is exercised, it is considered long-term capital gain under §1234(a), 
given the facts of the discussion example. 
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riod of the underlier.73 Accordingly, it is unclear why the granting of 
an option on appreciated property is not taxable on the grant date to 
the extent of at least the lesser of the appreciation or the option pre-
mium, with the character of the gain determined by up-front rule, 
possibly with adjustment down the road. 
2.   Basic Put Option 
 Under the facts of the discussion example, the mirror put option 
would have A transferring the $11.92 to B on Day 1 in exchange for 
the right, but not the obligation, to sell B the 100 shares of XYZ stock 
at $110.52 on Day 2.74 As the grantor of a put, B does not own the 
property subject to the option, so the worry that the receipt of the op-
tion premium represents partial payment for the underlier would 
seem to be misplaced. Again, however, the grantor receives the option 
premium with no tax consequences, raising questions about whether 
interest should be imputed to the transaction or the grantor should 
include the full premium on receipt under a claim of right or pre-
payment analysis. Claim of right generally requires a taxpayer to in-
clude, in income, an amount received that may be subject to a future 
return, as long as the taxpayer is not subject to restriction.75 Howev-
er, if later return is required, the taxpayer typically may take a de-
duction.76 Similarly, amounts received as prepayments for future ser-
vices generally are includible,77 subject to limited exceptions.78
 The transaction also has sale elements that would seem to point to 
possible recognition of gain for A. Although A does not receive cash, A
does obtain protection against downside loss because A can cash out 
the stock at any time prior to Day 2 for at least the present discounted 
value of $110.52 on Day 2. A thereby has disposed of risk of loss, one of 
the primary indicia of ownership.79 Whether that disposition ought to 
be sufficient to trigger recognition of gain or loss is less certain. Nu-
merous provisions in the tax law treat the disposition solely of risk of 
loss as something short of a sale but different from simple ownership, 
                                                                                                                    
 73. 26 U.S.C. §1234. 
 74. As in the case of the call option, the put price is derived using the Black-Scholes 
option pricing formula. See supra note 64-65. Where an option is ATM, the put and call 
prices are the same on the option sale date. 
 75. N. Am. Oil Consol. v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417, 424 (1932). 
 76. Id.; see also 26 U.S.C. § 1341 (providing deduction or credit choice to taxpayer for 
certain amounts returned). 
 77. 26 C.F.R. § 1.451-1(a) (cash-method taxpayers); Schlude v. Comm’r, 372 U.S. 128 
(1963) (discussing accrual-method taxpayers). 
 78. See, e.g., Artnell Co. v. Comm’r, 400 F.2d 981 (1968) (holding that deferral for ac-
crual-method taxpayer was allowed where amount and timing of future associated ex-
penses clearly ascertainable at time of receipt); Rev. Proc. 2004-342004-22 IRB 991 (de-
scribing one-year deferral for certain prepayments). 
 79. See Grodt & McKay Realty Inc. v. Comm’r, 77 T.C. 1221, 1237-38 (1981) (identify-
ing risk of economic loss as a primary aspect of tax ownership). 
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typically by tolling applicable holding periods.80 By the same token, no 
provision treats a transfer solely of risk of loss as sufficient to trigger 
recognition of income.81 Again, however, the idea that nothing of signi-
ficance for tax purposes has occurred seems questionable. 
3.   Special Situations 
 When an option is subject to a special regime, additional problems 
arise. These problems are not unique to the option setting but instead 
result from the inconsistent tax treatment of parties to the same 
transaction. As an example, a dealer in options may purchase a call 
from a non-dealer grantor. The dealer does not amortize the premium, 
but the option is marked to market annually.82 Consequently, income 
or loss is registered by just one side of the transaction while it is open. 
Similarly, and as discussed in the Introduction, taxpayers may take 
advantage of the different rules that apply to options embedded in no-
tional principal contracts or to options entered into as hedges83 to ob-
tain a timing or character benefit or to arbitrage a return. 
III.   SUGGESTED CONCEPTUAL APPROACH
 This Part develops an economic analysis of options that explains 
them in terms of the actual transactions that the parties to an option 
sale enter into. For purposes of this basic analysis, it is assumed that 
either the put purchaser or the call writer owns the underlier—that 
is, the analysis here applies to “covered” options. Subpart A states 
the theory and Subpart B provides a demonstration. The object is to 
provide an account of the economic consequences of option sales that 
illuminates the basic tax issues they raise. These issues are explored 
in Part IV. 
 The approach developed here relies on the Black-Scholes model for 
option pricing, but it does not assume that the model describes what 
                                                                                                                    
 80. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 246(c)(4) (holding period for purposes of dividend received 
deduction is not met during periods in which the taxpayer does not bear the risk of loss of 
ownership); 26 U.S.C. § 1058(b)(3) (requiring that the owner of securities in a securities 
lending transaction transfer to the borrower neither the risk of loss nor the opportunity for 
gain in the securities for the purpose of qualifying for nonrecognition treatment under 26 
U.S.C. § 1058(a); 26 U.S.C. § 1059(d)(3) (relying on § 246 rules to toll the holding period for 
purposes of satisfying the holding period exception to the application of the extraordinary 
dividend basis and gain rules). 
 81. For example, § 1259, which applies to “constructive sales” of “appreciated financial 
positions,” deems a disposition of such a position to occur where, among other things, a 
transaction has the effect of disposing of the benefits and burdens of ownership. See 26 
U.S.C. § 1259(c) (listing transactions). In Woodsam Associates, Inc. v. Commissioner, 16 
T.C. 649, 655 (1951), the court refused to treat the taxpayer’s nonrecourse borrowing, in 
excess of its basis in the property securing the debt, as a disposition of the property. 
 82. 26 U.S.C. § 475(a)(2). 
 83. 26 C.F.R. § 1.446-4(b) (2010) (requiring taxpayers to match the timing of a hedg-
ing transaction with the item hedged in a manner that clearly reflects income).  
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the parties to an option transaction actually do. Rather, it treats 
Black-Scholes as providing the correct mechanism for the pricing of 
financial options, recognizing that Black-Scholes itself is an idealized 
model that has great relevance but not direct application to the real 
world.84 Black and Scholes demonstrated how to model the purchase 
of an option as a combination of borrowing and purchasing or lending 
and selling fractional parts of the underlier, with continuous adjust-
ment of the initial loan and equity amounts as the determinants of 
the option price varied over time. The equivalence they established 
makes possible the accurate valuation of any financial option under 
idealized terms, and this valuation in turn is instrumental in ex-
plaining the actual transactions that parties to an option engage in. 
The equivalence does not imply, however, that the parties to the 
transaction should be treated as having engaged in the hypothetical 
debt and equity transactions that the model posits.85
A.   Statement of the Theory 
 A covered option is properly viewed as a division of the benefits 
and burdens of ownership of the underlier. To the extent the division 
is asymmetrical, so that one party assumes risks or acquires benefits 
of the underlier not associated with correlative benefits or risks of it, 
the option represents a transfer solely of either risk of loss or oppor-
tunity for gain in exchange for payment, typically cash.86 This feature 
of options has long been well understood. To the extent the division is 
symmetrical, so that one party acquires both benefits and correlative 
burdens of ownership of the underlier, the option represents an on-
market forward property disposition. This feature of options has not 
been well understood. Assuming as a first approximation that there 
is no premium associated with the assumption of risk, the value of 
the symmetrical transfer equals the value of a riskless instrument 
generating the associated interest during the option term. 
                                                                                                                    
 84. The Black-Scholes model makes a number of idealizing assumptions about op-
tions, including that volatility of the underlier can be known and that it is constant. The 
model also applies to simple options on nondividend paying securities, though it has been 
elaborated in various ways. For a general criticism of Black-Scholes as a model for under-
standing the pricing of actual options, see Adam H. Rosenzweig, Imperfect Financial Mar-
kets and the Hidden Costs of a Modern Income Tax, 62 SMU L. REV. 239, 288 (2009) (de-
scribing as an “open secret” the fact that Black-Scholes is wrong in assuming constant vo-
latility of the underlier). 
 85. In an earlier article, the author suggested rules for the taxation of financial op-
tions based on treating the parties as having engaged in the hypothetical transactions that 
Black and Scholes posit. David Hasen, A Realization-Based Approach to the Taxation of 
Financial instruments, 57 TAX L. REV. 397, 439-40. Eric Chason later provided a similar, 
though more developed, approach. Chason, supra note 8. The present discussion focuses in-
stead on the transactions in which the parties to an option actually engage. 
 86. I thank Patrick White for clarification on this point. 
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 As will be seen, under this theory, the point at which what I call 
the true “optionality” of an option—either the purchase of a fluctuat-
ing return or the offloading of a fluctuating risk, in either case in ex-
change for a fixed fee—reaches its maximum is where the asymmetry 
between risk-bearing and benefit-reaping is complete. This point oc-
curs for options sold at a strike price that equals the forward price of 
the underlier on the strike date, in other words, for options sold (in 
present value terms) at the money. Beyond this point—that is, for op-
tions issued in the money—there is simply no more possible off-
loading solely of risk (put option) or purchase solely of potential bene-
fit (call option) with respect to the underlier. Rather, any additional 
component of the option sale is simply the forward transfer of a por-
tion of the risk correlative to the potential benefit transferred (call 
option) or potential benefit correlative to the risk transferred (put op-
tion) by the owner of the underlier that would have remained with 
the owner had the option not been ITM. Because this transfer of cor-
relative risk and potential benefit is a transfer of both opportunity for 
gain and risk of loss, it is, if not a property transaction, closely akin 
to one. Further, because the slice is a symmetrical transfer of poten-
tial risk and potential benefit, its value on the option sale date is 
simply the value of a debt instrument that would earn the corres-
ponding time value return during the option period (disregarding, for 
the moment, the possibility that risk preferences are asymmetrically 
distributed among market participants).87
 Viewed along a spectrum running from options sold out of the 
money, to options sold at the money, to options sold in the money, the 
following then can be said to occur on the option sale date: 
? In the OTM case, a portion of either the risk of loss (put 
option) or the opportunity for benefit (call option) associated 
with ownership of the underlier is transferred in exchange 
for a cash payment; 
? In the ATM case, the entirety of either the risk of loss or 
the opportunity for benefit associated with ownership of the 
underlier is transferred in return for a cash payment; and 
? In the ITM case, a portion of either the risk of loss or the 
opportunity for benefit associated with ownership of the un-
derlier is transferred in return for a cash payment, just as in 
the OTM case, together with a forward disposition of symme-
trical portions of the benefits and burdens of ownership of 
the underlier. Because possession of the opportunity for 
benefit together with the correlative risk of loss is typically 
                                                                                                                    
 87.  See infra Part II.B.2. 
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paradigmatic of tax ownership,88 this associated transfer can 
be considered a forward property transfer. 
In short, an ITM option differs from the corresponding OTM option 
not by having more “optionality,” but in that the ITM option has an 
associated property transfer that actually reduces the optionality as 
compared with an ATM option. This analysis explains how options 
shade into forward contracts—the greater the extent to which the op-
tion is ITM on the option sale date, the more the option sale consti-
tutes a symmetrical transfer of benefits and burdens. At the limit, 
where the strike price is zero, all benefits and burdens have been 
transferred on the option sale date. An option with a zero strike price 
is a forward sale of the underlier.89
 Diagram 1 illustrates these ideas. It contains four pictograms. In 
each, the horizontal axis represents the fair market value of the under-
lier on the exercise date, and the vertical axis represents the extent of 
risk and benefit retained or disposed of on that date; A and B are the 
parties to the option transaction, except in the first pictogram. For 
ease of exposition, the risk-free rate at all times is assumed to be zero 
and the risk preferences of market participants are disregarded. 
 The first pictogram represents A’s simple ownership of the under-
lier. A retains, by definition, all risk of loss and all opportunity for 
gain, represented by the arrows going down to zero and up infinitely. 
 The second pictogram illustrates the effect of A’s sale of a call op-
tion to B having a strike price of S1. B has acquired the upside poten-
tial in excess of S1, while A has retained upside potential to that point 
as well as all the downside risk of underlier. Since S1 exceeds the FMV 
on the exercise date, the option is OTM. Note that the option purchas-
er bears no risk of loss as measured on the option sale date. 
 The third pictogram represents A’s sale of an ATM call option hav-
ing a strike price, S2, equal to the underlier’s FMV. Here the optio-
nality—the separation of the opportunity for gain from the risk of 
loss—reaches its maximum. B is entitled to all opportunity for bene-
fit and bears no risk of loss, all of which A retains. Under the theory 
described above, the option premium paid is at its maximum for this 
option, even though ITM options would have higher nominal pre-
miums. Therefore, although an ITM option, as represented in the 
fourth pictogram showing an option with a strike price equal to S3,
                                                                                                                    
 88. Grodt & McKay Realty, Inc. v. Comm’r, 77 T.C. 1221,1243-44 (1981). 
 89. See David F. Levy, Disparities in Tax Treatment Among Prepaid Forward Con-
tracts, Deep in the Money Options, Prepaid Swaps, and Contingent Debt Instruments, in 
TAX STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, DISPOSITIONS, SPIN-OFFS, JOINT 
VENTURES, FINANCINGS, REORGANIZATIONS & RESTRUCTURINGS,  432 PLI/Tax 729, 745 
n.24 (1998) (“Indeed, as the option premium increases and the strike price of the option de-
creases, the economic differences between a deep in the money purchase option and a stan-
dard prepaid forward contract begin to disappear.”).
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will have a higher nominal option premium than the premium for the 
option having the ATM strike price of S2, the higher premium will be 
made up for in the stream of future payments under the option. That 
is, the timing of payouts under the S3 option hides the fact that the 
true swap of fluctuating for nonfluctuating payments is the same as 
it is under the S1 option and therefore lower than it is under the S2
option. The optionality pieces of the S1 and S3 transactions—that is, 
the portions that represent the transfer of fluctuating benefits for 
cash—are the same and are smaller than the optionality piece under 
the ATM option (S2).
 The fact that the optionality pieces are the same for the depicted 
OTM and ITM options does not mean that the two options are the 
same. It means only that the way in which they differ has to do with 
what else is transferred in the ITM case. In an OTM option, all that 
occurs is an exchange of a fixed payment for either the right to a por-
tion of fluctuating upside returns (in a call) or the off-loading of a 
portion of fluctuating downside risk (in a put). In the corresponding 
ITM option, that same exchange occurs, but there is, in addition, an 
on-market forward transfer of a symmetrical portion of the opportu-
nity for gain and the risk of loss of the underlier. This portion is 
represented in the fourth pictogram by the dual-pointing arrow that 
crosses the FMV line. As contrasted with the swap of benefit (or risk 
in the case of a put) for cash that characterizes the optionality piece, 
the only net consideration that travels in the other direction is the in-
terest that would be earned on the transfer because the owner of the 
underlier transfers a risk that exactly offsets, in expected value, the 
benefit that is also transferred. Diagram 2 summarizes these points.  
Diagram 1:  Simple Ownership and Three Types of Option Transfers 
810 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:789 
 Diagram 2:  Extent of Optionality 
 The obvious objection to this view is that if the option writer in an 
ITM option is considered to be absorbing less risk for cash (in the 
case of a put) or parting with less potential benefit for cash (in the 
case of a call) than is the writer of an ATM option, and if the related 
property transaction under an ITM option is not cashed out until the 
exercise date (whether or not exercise occurs), then the price for an 
ATM option should exceed the price of both an OTM option and an 
ITM option, other things being equal. In fact, of course, the option 
price continues to rise as the negotiated terms of the option go farth-
er into the money on the option sale date. For instance, if an OTM 
option costs $X on the option sale date, an ATM option having other-
wise identical terms will cost more than $X on that date and an ITM 
option will cost still more. The price structure of options seems to 
suggest that the true optionality increases continuously from deep 
OTM, through ATM, to deep ITM. 
 In fact, the price structure is misleading. The higher price for ITM 
options reflects nothing more than a payment scheduling arrange-
ment. The price increase for the option premium attributable to the 
option’s having an ITM strike price is precisely made up for in the 
payout structure under the option. Viewed as a whole, the portion of 
the overall ITM option sale that represents an asymmetrical ex-
change of risky returns for nonrisky returns, or what I call the true 
option piece of an ITM option, is smaller and therefore costs less than 
an ATM option by precisely the amount of the associated property 
disposition. The pure option piece of an ITM option, that is, the por-
tion of the option premium received in exchange for absorbing risk 
(put) or providing opportunity for gain (call), has the same cost as the 
identical OTM option. 
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 These considerations indicate that the property disposition portion 
of an ITM option is actually the mirror image of another common 
transaction, known as a “collar.” In a collar, the owner of property 
disposes of the potential upside benefit above a certain price as well 
as the risk of loss below a certain price, retaining opportunity for 
gain and risk of loss in-between.90 For example, A may own XYZ 
stock having a current fair market value of $100. If A sells a call at 
$110 and buys a put at $90, A retains the opportunity for gain and 
risk of loss within the $90 to $110 band but has disposed of the re-
maining opportunity and risk. In the property disposition portion of a 
mirror ITM option, the property owner would retain the opportunity 
for gain above $110 and the risk of loss below $90 but dispose of the 
opportunity and risk in-between. The only difference between this re-
tention and an actual ITM option is that the on-market property dis-
position in the ITM option is married to an OTM option, so that ei-
ther the remaining downside risk (in the case of a put) or the remain-
ing upside potential (in the case of a call) accompanies the symme-
trical disposition of opportunity and risk. This additional transfer al-
so serves to obscure the forward property disposition that occurs in 
the ITM portion of an ITM option. 
B.   Demonstration 
 The following illustrations convey these ideas in a series of steps. In 
Section 1, the assumed risk-free rate is zero and parties’ risk prefe-
rences are disregarded. These assumptions are made to illustrate the 
basic nature of option transactions, and they are relaxed in Section 2. 
In addition, the discussion does not begin with an option, but with the 
type of nonoption property disposition that occurs in an ITM option. 
True option arrangements are then added (i.e., exchanges, for cash, of 
risk of loss or opportunity for benefit), showing that the resulting 
transactions are identical to options observed in the marketplace. 
 Throughout this Subpart: (1) Owner is the owner of Underlier, a 
piece of fungible property worth $100 on the option sale date; and 
(2) Purchaser agrees on the option sale date to purchase some or all 
of the property from Owner, to engage in related transactions on the 
exercise date, or both. 
1.   Risk Neutrality and Zero Risk-Free Rate 
 In this Section, the risk-free rate of return is assumed to be 0% 
and risk preferences are assumed to be neutrally distributed among 
                                                                                                                    
 90. See, e.g., 26 C.F.R. § 1.446-3(f)(2)(v) (2010) (prescribing the tax treatment of col-
lars embedded in a notional principal contract). 
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market participants, meaning that no one pays a premium to assume 
risk or to shed it. 
a.   Neutral Disposition of Upside Potential and Downside Risk 
 Consider first a basic forward transfer of the opportunity for gain 
and the risk of loss on a portion of Underlier.  
Transaction 1: On-market division. On Day 1, Owner 
sells Purchaser the first 25% of the upside potential and 
Purchaser agrees to assume the first 25% of the downside 
risk in the price of Underlier as measured on Day 2, one 
year later. 
 In Transaction 1, the only transfer that occurs on Day 1 is of the 
risks and benefits associated with the 25% disposition. Because the 
interest rate is zero, Purchaser will pay nothing to Owner on Day 1. 
(If on Day 1 Purchaser wished to acquire the 25% interest on Day 2, 
Purchaser could also promise on Day 1 to pay, on Day 2, 25% of the 
value of Underlier as measured on Day 1. Of course, in the financial 
instruments context, either party is indifferent between ownership of 
the market value of a property right and the property right itself.) 
The parties could effect Transaction 1 by entering into (1) a forward 
sale of Underlier on Day 1 for $100 with a settlement date of Day 2, 
(2) Purchaser’s sale to Owner of a call on Underlier with a strike 
price equal to $100 plus the appreciation up to the first 25% of ex-
pected upside benefit as measured on Day 2 and a strike date of Day 
2, and (3) Owner’s sale to Purchaser of a put with a strike price equal 
to $100 less the decline up to the first 25% of expected downside risk 
as measured on Day 2 and a strike date of Day 2. The values of (2) 
and (3), by hypothesis, are equal and offsetting. Further, since the 
parties are willing to cash-settle Transaction 1, they could do so 
simply by agreeing, instead of to transactions (1) through (3), that on 
Day 2 Owner would pay Purchaser the actual appreciation, if any, up 
to the amount representing the first 25% of the potential upside ben-
efit in Underlier as measured on Day 1. Purchaser would then pay 
Owner the actual decline in value, if any, up to the amount 
representing the first 25% of the potential downside risk, also as 
measured on Day 1. 
 The range of values that corresponds to the first 25% of the oppor-
tunity for benefit and risk of loss in Underlier can be computed using 
the familiar Black-Scholes option pricing theorem. This is done by 
setting the put and call option premiums equal to 75% of the price of 
an ATM option (put or call) as measured on Day 2 and deriving the 
associated option strike prices. In dollar terms, this range will be 
asymmetrical around the Day 2 forward price (as measured on Day 
1), or $100, because on Day 2 Underlier can assume any positive val-
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ue but no negative value.91 Assuming moderate volatility of 10%, the 
range is $102.27 to $97.94.92 Thus, Owner will pay Purchaser the 
excess, if any, of the value on Day 2 of Underlier over $100, up to 
$102.27, and Purchaser will pay Owner the excess, if any, of $100 
over the value on Day 2 of Underlier, down to $97.94. 
b.   Neutral Disposition Plus OTM Put Option 
 Now suppose that in addition to Transaction 1, Purchaser agrees 
on Day 1 to pay the drop in value, if any, of Underlier below $97.94, 
as measured on Day 2.  
Transaction 2: Division plus put option. The facts are 
the same as in Transaction 1, but Purchaser also agrees to 
pay the excess, if any, of $97.94 over the FMV of Underlier 
on Day 2. Owner transfers $3.00 to Purchaser on Day 1. The 
parties agree to cash-settle on Day 2. 
 Note that Transaction 2 differs from Transaction 1 solely in that it 
adds Purchaser’s sale of an OTM put to Owner with a strike price of 
$97.94. The put option part of Transaction 2 is the transfer of risk 
with respect to possible declines below $97.49. Under the same as-
sumptions about Underlier as apply in Transaction 1, the put value 
under the Black-Scholes formula is $3.00. 
 On Day 2, the following outcomes are possible in Transaction 2: 
1. FMV of Underlier equals or exceeds $102.27:  Owner 
pays Purchaser $2.27. 
2. FMV of Underlier is between $100 and $102.27:  Owner 
pays Purchaser the excess of the FMV over $100. 
3. FMV of Underlier is less than $100: Purchaser pays 
Owner the difference between $100 and the FMV.93
 The critical point to recognize is that the precise economic ar-
rangement that Transaction 2 effects can be replicated under a num-
ber of different payment schedules. Owner can pay less or more up 
front in exchange for more or less payment on Day 2, as long as in-
terest is appropriately accounted for. (And since, under the simplified 
                                                                                                                    
 91. The Black-Scholes theorem accounts for this asymmetry through the assumption 
that returns are log-normally rather than normally distributed about the forward price. 
See HULL, supra note 1, at 277-79. 
 92. These figures represent the strike prices of a call priced at $3 and a put priced at 
$3 when an ATM (whether put or call) is priced at $4. The analysis would not change if the 
volatility were different, though the range of prices would change. 
 93. That is, Purchaser pays up to $2.06 under the piece of Transaction 2 that Transac-
tion 1 represents, and Purchaser pays the excess, if any, of $97.94 over the FMV of Under-
lier on Day 2, which is Purchaser’s obligation under the put part of Transaction 2. This 
sum is the same as what is stated in the text. 
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assumptions here, the interest rate is zero, there is no discounting ef-
fect from prepayment.) In particular, suppose the parties wanted to 
ensure that Owner’s only payment to Purchaser occurs on Day 1. 
They could agree to the following: 
Transaction 3: Division plus option plus prepayment.
Same as Transaction 2, but Owner pays an additional $2.27 
to Purchaser on Day 1, for a total of $5.27, and receives an 
additional $2.27 under each payout scenario. The parties 
agree to cash-settle on Day 2. 
 The payouts of Transaction 3 on Day 2 are as follows: 
1. FMV of Underlier equals or exceeds $102.27:  No pay-
ments. 
2. FMV of Underlier is less than $102.27:  Purchaser pays 
Owner difference between $102.27 and FMV. 
 The net value of Transaction 3 is exactly the same as that of 
Transaction 2 because all that has happened is that $2.27 more has 
been paid to Purchaser up front and, in each case, the same $2.27 has 
been subtracted from Purchaser’s payout or added to Purchaser’s 
payment obligation on Day 2. Because the discount rate is assumed 
to be 0% in this pattern, the present value on Day 1 of $2.27 on Day 2 
is $2.27. 
 Note, however, that Transaction 3 has exactly the same payout 
structure as an ITM put option. 
Transaction 4: ITM put option. Owner pays Purchaser 
$5.27 on Day 1 in exchange for the right to sell Underlier to 
Purchaser on Day 2 for $102.27. The parties cash-settle the 
obligation on Day 2. 
 It is in fact the case that under the same Black-Scholes pricing 
model that produced the price of $3.00 for an OTM put with a strike 
price of $97.94, the price of a $102.27 put option for Underlier on 
these terms is $5.27. In other words, this ITM put is the same as an 
OTM put plus the associated property transfer described in Transac-
tion 1. As explained above, this result should not be surprising be-
cause it is not possible for the option writer to provide more price 
protection with respect to the underlier than is available under an 
ATM option.94
                                                                                                                    
 94. The statement should be qualified because the parties could enter into an ar-
rangement in which the option writer agrees to overcompensate the option holder for a 
drop in price (or, for that matter, to supplement an increase in price). For example, the 
parties to a put option could provide that the option writer would pay the option holder 1.5 
times the drop in price, if any, prior to exercise. Such a transaction would in effect mimic 
the option holder’s purchase of an additional interest in the underlier, together with more 
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 The preceding discussion suggests the following points: 
? An ATM option represents nothing more than the com-
plete separation of the benefits and burdens of ownership of 
the underlier between the parties to the option transaction. 
? An OTM option is the same as an ATM option, except 
that it is a separation of a smaller percentage of the total 
benefits and burdens. 
? An ITM option is the same as an OTM option plus the on-
market forward sale of a portion of the benefits and correla-
tive burdens of ownership of the underlier. That is, in an 
ITM option, some of the exchange of fluctuating returns 
(call) or risks (put) for fixed consideration that would other-
wise be supplied in an ATM option is replaced by a correla-
tive transfer of the risks (call) or fluctuating returns (put) of 
some of the underlier, and the balance is an OTM option 
transaction. The transfer of fluctuating returns and correla-
tive risks is a transfer of ownership. On the facts above, the 
swap of variable risk for cash in the ITM put option—that is, 
the true option piece—is the same as the swap provided un-
der the OTM put having a strike price of $97.94. 
o To the extent the ITM option involves the symmetric-
al transfer of risks and benefits about the FMV ex-
pected on the strike date, it is the mirror image of a col-
lar. In a collar, one party retains the risks and benefits 
over a range of values straddling the FMV and disposes 
of the benefits above that range and the risks below it. 
A party creates a collar by writing a call at the above-
market price and purchasing a put at the below-market 
price. In general, the put and call prices are the same if 
the percentages of risk and benefit disposed of are the 
same. 
The ITM portion of an ITM option is the mirror image 
of a collar in that the purchaser of the collar retains the 
value straddling the FMV on the strike date and dis-
poses of the tails of the distribution, while the call seller 
or put purchaser sells the straddling portion and re-
tains the tails. 
? The fact that an ITM option costs more than an OTM or 
ATM option reflects nothing more than a payment arrange-
                                                                                                                    
price protection. I omit consideration of such arrangements here, as they are not observed 
in the market (as far as I am aware). Further, the same basic analysis would apply, though 
with more complexity. 
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ment between the parties; no additional consideration is ex-
changed for the ITM portion apart from interest or a risk 
premium. 
c.   Extension to Call Option 
 A call option differs from a put in that the writer disposes of up-
side potential instead of assuming downside risk. The net effect, 
however, is the same:  the option sale effects an asymmetrical distri-
bution of risks and benefits in the underlier so that the writer pos-
sesses risks not associated with offsetting benefits. As in the case of a 
put, the maximum optionality occurs when the option writer ends up 
with all downside risk and the option holder has all the upside poten-
tial—namely, an ATM call. When the option is OTM on the option 
sale date, there is less potential benefit transferred and, correspon-
dingly, a lower option price. Where the option is ITM on the option 
sale date, there is a greater option price than in the ATM case, but 
only because a part of the price represents the same type of forward 
transfer that arises in the case of a put—that is, a disposition of a 
symmetrical portion of the burdens and benefits of the underlier. 
 The following examples, which use the same assumptions as in 
the case of the put, illustrate these points. First, recall Transaction 1: 
On-market division. On Day 1, Owner sells Purchaser the first 25% 
of the upside potential and Purchaser agrees to assume the first 25% 
of the downside potential in Underlier between Day 1 and Day 2, one 
year thereafter. 
 It was shown that the price range corresponding to the first 25% 
of the benefits and burdens is $102.27 to $97.94. Thus, if the parties 
cash-settle, then on Day 2, Owner pays Purchaser the excess, if any, 
of the difference between Underlier’s FMV and $100, up to $2.27. At 
the same time, Purchaser pays the excess, if any, of the difference be-
tween $100 and Underlier’s FMV, up to $2.06. 
 Additionally, the parties could effect Transaction 1 with a differ-
ent schedule of payments. In the case of a call option, Owner writes 
the option, so the parties can arrange for a single payment by having 
Purchaser rather than Owner prepay.  
Transaction 1a:  On-market division with prepay-
ment. Same as Transaction 1, except that on Day 1, Pur-
chaser pays Owner $2.06, and on Day 2 Owner will net a 
$2.06 payment to Purchaser with whatever other payment is 
required on that day to effect the transfer of the first 25% of 
upside potential and downside risk. 
 The only difference between Transactions 1 and 1a is that the par-
ties have rearranged the timing of their payments. In Transaction 1a, 
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on Day 2, Owner pays Purchaser the excess, if any, of the difference 
between Underlier’s FMV and $97.94, up to $102.27. 
 Finally, suppose that the parties engage in the following transac-
tion, in addition to Transaction 1a.  
Transaction 5:  OTM call. On Day 1, Owner separately 
sells an OTM call to Purchaser with a strike price of 
$102.27, exercisable on Day 2, in one year. 
 The price of the call is $3.00. Assume again that all transactions 
are cash-settled. As in the put option case, the payouts under the 
combination of Transaction 1a and Transaction 5 are the same as 
under Owner’s simple sale of an ITM call to Purchaser with a strike 
price of $97.94. Moreover, Purchaser’s combined payment on Day 1 of 
$5.06 is the same as the Black-Scholes price for this ITM call.95
2.   Positive Risk-Free Rate 
 This Section extends the analysis of Section 1 to the more realistic 
setting in which the risk-free rate of return is positive. In this con-
text, the transfer of funds gives rise to an interest payment for the 
use of money, whether or not the interest payment is expressly bro-
ken out. Consequently, in addition to the exchange of risky returns 
for a fixed payment and, in the case of an ITM option, the transfer of 
beneficial ownership of a portion of the underlier, there also will be 
interest paid in the transaction. If the analysis under the zero risk-
free rate holds, the same results should follow as before, except that 
this interest piece should be present as well. 
 All assumptions in this Section are the same as in Section 1,  
except that the hypothetical risk-free rate is 10% and it is com-
pounded continuously. 
a.   Neutral Disposition of Upside Potential and Downside Risk 
 Consider again a basic forward transfer of equal and offsetting 
opportunity for gain and risk of loss on Underlier.  
Transaction 6: On-market division. On Day 1, Owner 
sells Purchaser the first 25% of the upside potential and 
Purchaser agrees to assume the first 25% of the downside 
risk in the price of Underlier as measured on and Day 2, one 
year thereafter. 
                                                                                                                    
 95. The cost of the option is $5.06, rather than $5.27 in the case of a put, because the 
cost of offloading the first 25% of the downside potential is $2.06, while the cost of purchas-
ing the first 25% of upside is $2.27. This difference reflects the fact that in an option, the 
minimum value the underlier can take on the exercise date is 0, while there is in principle 
no maximum value, and in the call case the payment goes in the other direction. See gener-
ally HULL, supra note 1, at 277-79. 
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 At a continuously compounded rate of 10%, the expected value of 
Underlier on Day 2 is $110.52,96 and the price of either a call or a put 
with that strike price would, as in the case of a zero risk-free rate, be 
$4. Analogously, an on-market disposition of the first 25% of poten-
tial upside gain and the first 25% of downside risk would correspond 
to a range of values for Underlier on Day 2 bounded by the strike 
prices for a call and a put each having a cost of $3.00. This range is 
$108.24 as the strike price for the put to $113.02 as the strike price 
for the call. The only difference between this case and the zero risk-
free rate case is that the range over which payments will be made on 
Day 2 has shifted up and expanded by the amount of interest ex-
pected.97 If on Day 2 Underlier has appreciated, Owner pays Pur-
chaser the lesser of $2.50 (equal to $113.02 less $110.52) or the dif-
ference between Underlier’s FMV on Day 2 and $110.52. If on Day 2 
Underlier has declined in value, Purchaser pays Owner the lesser of 
$2.28 (equal to $110.52 less $108.24) or the difference between 
$110.52 and Underlier’s FMV on Day 2. 
b.   Neutral Disposition Plus OTM Put Option 
 The same ITM put option that was replicated through the combina-
tion of an OTM put and a neutral on-market division when the risk-
free rate was assumed to be zero looks as follows under a 10% rate:  
Transaction 7: Division plus OTM put option. Same as 
Transaction 6, but Purchaser also agrees to pay the excess, 
if any, of $108.24 over the FMV of Underlier on Day 2. Own-
er transfers $3.00 to Purchaser on Day 1. The parties agree 
to cash-settle on Day 2. 
 The payout structure under this combination is as follows: 
1. FMV of Underlier equals or exceeds $113.02:  Owner 
pays Purchaser $2.50. 
2. FMV of Underlier is between $113.02 and $110.52:  
Owner pays Purchaser the excess of the FMV over $110.52. 
3. FMV of Underlier is less than $110.52: Purchaser pays 
Owner the difference between $110.52 and the FMV.98
                                                                                                                    
 96. The formula for continuous compounding is FV = PeYr, where FV is future value, e
is the base of the natural logarithm, Y is the number of years to maturity and r is the in-
terest rate expressed as a decimal. 
 97. Thus, the spread between $97.96 and $102.27 is $4.33. The $4.33 invested at 10% 
with continuous compounding for one year is $4.78, which is the difference between 
$113.02 and $108.24, the spread on Day 2 in Transaction 6. 
 98. That is, Purchaser pays up to $2.28 under the piece of Transaction 7 that Transac-
tion 6 represents, and Purchaser pays the excess, if any, of $108.24 over the FMV of Under-
lier on Day 2, which is Purchaser’s obligation under the OTM put portion of Transaction 7. 
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 As before, this transaction can be replicated under a payment 
schedule that is front-loaded so that Owner pays Purchaser just once, 
on Day 1, with no change to the underlying economics. As in the zero 
risk-free rate case, this adjustment requires that the maximum 
amount Owner may be required to pay on Day 2 under Transaction 7 
be incorporated into the payments on Day 1. The difference, however, 
is that because the risk-free rate is non-zero, the Day 1 additional 
payment must be appropriately discounted. In Transaction 7, Own-
er’s maximum payout on Day 2 is $2.50. Owner can be guaranteed 
not to have to make that payout on Day 2 if on Day 1 Owner pays, in 
addition to the $3.00 for the OTM put option, the present value of 
$2.50 as measured on Day 2 and, in exchange, receives $2.50 more on 
Day 2 than Owner would have received in Transaction 7. The value 
on Day 1 of $2.50 as measured on Day 2 is $2.26.99 Therefore, the 
parties can replicate Transaction 7 as follows: 
Transaction 8: Division plus option plus prepayment.
Same as Transaction 7, but Owner pays an additional $2.26 
to Purchaser on Day 1, for a total of $5.26, and receives an 
additional $2.50 under each payout scenario. The parties 
agree to cash-settle on Day 2. 
 The payouts of Transaction 8 on Day 2 are as follows: 
1. FMV of Underlier equals or exceeds $113.02:  No pay-
ments. 
2. FMV of Underlier is between $110.52 and $113.02:  Pur-
chaser pays Owner difference between $113.02 and FMV. 
3. FMV of Underlier is less than $110.52:  Purchaser pays 
Owner $2.50 plus difference between $110.52 and FMV, or 
difference between $113.02 and FMV. 
 This payout structure is the same as that for an ITM put having a 
strike price of $113.02, and, again, the Black-Scholes price for this 
option is $5.26. 
c.   Accounting for the Time Value of Money 
 The discussion above indicates that the analysis when the risk-
free rate is positive does not differ from the analysis when the risk-
free rate is zero, except that the time value of money plays a role. Its 
presence in the ITM option is easiest to see because the price struc-
ture of the portion of the ITM option that represents a disposition of 
economic ownership (risk and correlative benefit) incorporates a dis-
count rate on the prepayment. Discounting, however, is no less 
                                                                                                                    
 99. That is, $2.26 invested at 10% continuously compounded yields $2.50 in one year. 
820 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:789 
present in the true option piece. If the portion of the option premium 
that represents an exchange of fluctuating returns for a fixed pay-
ment were unconditionally due on the exercise date rather than pay-
able on the option sale date, the premium would be more expensive 
by an amount equal to the accrued interest on the premium between 
the date of entry into the option and the exercise date.100
 However, the fact that one can impute an interest rate to establish 
economic equivalents between payments made on Day 1 and on Day 
2 does not settle the question of whether an interest or discounting 
element is present in the standard option transaction, where the op-
tion premium is paid on Day 1. In particular, it does not demonstrate 
that the option purchaser gets the benefit of a discounted price for 
the option. That benefit arises only if the option premium is economi-
cally prepaid—that is, if the benefit that the option purchaser obtains 
is received later than the payment date. If so, then there has been an 
extension of the use of money for a period of time, which is to say a 
loan, rather than a simultaneous exchange of consideration for goods 
or services.101 To illustrate, if on Day 1 A and B agree that A will pay 
B today for services to be rendered in one year, interest should be 
imputed to A (and deemed paid by B) on the implicit loan that runs 
from A to B:  the price to A would be higher if A paid for the services 
when rendered in one year.102 The difference between the price A ac-
tually pays and what the services would cost if paid for when ren-
dered is an interest charge. Analogously, if on Day 1 A and B agree 
that B will provide the service to A immediately and A will pay for 
them in one year and performance actually occurs in one year, then 
the loan runs in the other direction—from B to A. 
 In the option context, the question is whether the option purchas-
er receives an immediate or ongoing benefit from the time the option 
is entered into, in which case the premium is at most partially dis-
counted and therefore partially a loan, or instead the purchaser rece-
ives a benefit only on the exercise date (or dates, for American op-
tions). In the latter case, the loan element is clear:  the option writer 
is paid now for benefits delivered only later. The considerations de-
veloped in Part II suggest that all benefits of the option transaction 
materialize economically on the exercise date (or dates); therefore, 
that interest does economically arise on all parts of the premium 
prior to that time. Consider first a simple European option, under 
which the option purchaser acquires a right that may be exercised on 
                                                                                                                    
 100. See Daniel I. Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Taxing the “Time Value of Money”, 95 
YALE L.J. 506, 512-15 (1986). 
 101. Klein, supra note 69, at 1709-10. 
 102. See generally Halperin, supra note 100, at 512-15. 
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only one exercise date. Although, as one commentator observes,103 the 
option purchaser acquires a valuable right on the option purchase 
date, that fact merely establishes that future rights have a present 
value, not that benefits are conferred when the future right is ac-
quired. The purchaser of a remainder interest in property also ac-
quires valuable rights on purchase, but it does not appear that the 
rights are used prior to the ripening of the interest. The question, 
therefore, is not whether the option purchaser acquires a valuable 
right on the option purchase date. Rather, it is whether any of the 
rights so acquired are immediately cashed out, and it seems clear 
that they are not. If they were, one would expect a systematic decline 
in the value of rights during the period between the option purchase 
date and the exercise date. No such decline takes place. Indeed, one 
does not imagine that if, after the option sale, the option writer sig-
naled that it would default on the exercise date, the option holder’s 
damages would be discounted by the portion of the pre-exercise pe-
riod that had elapsed. Further, on the writer side, nothing is required 
until the exercise date. Prior to that time, the writer merely stands 
ready to perform. 
 The question is more difficult for an American option. The analy-
sis runs the same for the period prior to the first exercise date, but it 
is less clear how to analyze the period during which exercise is possi-
ble. In purely legal terms, during the exercise period, the option writ-
er has an ongoing obligation to do something until the earlier of exer-
cise or lapse, suggesting that benefits may be provided continuously 
during the exercise period. Even so, the fact of an on-going obligation 
does not seem to give rise to the transfer of an on-going benefit or 
service. Unlike a person who contracts to provide services as needed 
over a fixed period of time, the obligation under an option contract is 
singular. The option writer has only one obligation; prior to fulfilling 
it, the writer need do nothing, just as during the pre-exercise period. 
Conversely, once exercise occurs, the duty is fully discharged. The on-
ly difference between the writer’s obligations before the exercise pe-
riod and during the period prior to exercise is that the writer may be 
more constrained in its use of resources because it must have the re-
sources on hand at all times from the first exercise date until exercise 
or lapse. This heightened obligation appears to be relatively trivial. 
 Further, the case for treating the service as provided on exercise is 
even stronger in economic, as opposed to legal, terms. As a matter of 
economic theory, any call option should be exercised on the last day 
of the exercise period because of the benefit in ex ante terms that the 
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passage of time has on its value.104 Under the reasonable assumption 
that holders of financial options act solely on the basis of the econom-
ic dictates of their positions, an American call option should be 
viewed as equivalent to a European call option whose strike date is 
the last day of the American option’s strike period. This general rule 
must be qualified for put options because the value of the right to in-
vest the proceeds of sale on exercise of the put may exceed the value 
of the potential fluctuations in the underlier price, depending on the 
extent to which the put is ITM during the exercise period, the volatil-
ity of the underlier, and the risk-free rate.105 Nonetheless, the fact 
that all of the value of the put, like that of a call, is realized on exer-
cise suggests again that all benefits, if any, are realized on exercise. 
3.   Risk Premium 
 The discussion to this point has disregarded the market in risk; 
instead, it has proceeded on the assumption that market participants 
are as apt to take on risk as to lay it off, with the consequence that no 
party to the option transaction receives a fee to engage in the trans-
action. In practice, however, risk-bearing is costly because of the 
marginal utility of wealth, which means there is a systematic bias 
against risk assumption.106 Individuals with low wealth will suffer a 
greater subjective cost from the loss of a dollar than they will enjoy a 
benefit from the gain of a dollar, while individuals with greater 
wealth are less subject to these costs. Thus, wealthier individuals 
tend to assume more risk than poorer ones. For example, individuals 
increase the proportion of fixed to variable returns in their portfolios 
as they age because107 time is an inchoate form of wealth that inves-
tors transform into material wealth by investing in riskier returns 
earlier in their lives. Earlier generations pay later ones to do this. 
Similarly, more skilled individuals such as dealers or traders bear 
risk as a service to others and receive compensation for doing so. The 
compensation is typically observed in such items as the spreads that 
dealers charge, insurance fees, and the systematic difference between 
fixed and floating rates of interest observed in swap transactions.108
 The phenomenon of fixed-for-floating-exchange that lies at the 
core of any option transaction might suggest that put writers and call 
purchasers systematically charge a premium to take on downside 
risk or to cash out upside benefit in any option arrangement. The in-
                                                                                                                    
 104. HULL, supra note 1, at 211-12. 
 105. Id. at 212-14. 
 106. See generally Sergio Pastorello et al., Statistical Inference for Random-Variance 
Option Pricing, 18 J. BUS. & ECON. STAT. 358 (2000). 
 107. Nancy Ammon Jianakoplos & Alexandra Bernasek, Financial Risk Taking by Age 
and Birth Cohort, 72 S. ECON. J. 981, 983 (2006).  
 108. See generally id. 
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tuition is clear in the case of put writers, who enable the option pur-
chaser to cash out all downside risk for a fixed price while retaining 
the opportunity to benefit from market appreciation. The extension to 
call purchasers, however, does not hold. The reason for this is that 
risk premiums are present because of the unpredictability of losses, 
not of returns generally whether losses or gains.109 It is the prospect 
of a loss, which is more costly for persons of relatively lower wealth, 
that generates a risk premium. Bearing in mind that the owner of 
any underlier can eliminate all risk simply by selling the underlier 
and investing in a riskless instrument, the owner of the underlier 
will not sell a call to lock in a fixed upside while continuing to bear 
downside risk unless the owner is paid a fee. That fee is a risk pre-
mium. Thus, in general, option holders pay option writers a risk 
premium. This premium should be observable as a higher option 
premium for both puts and calls, to the extent in either case the 
holder acquires a floating benefit or disposes of a floating loss. 
 This analysis suggests a testable hypothesis. The theory developed 
in this paper is that all options contain an asymmetric exchange of a 
fixed payment either to receive a variable benefit (call option), or to 
shed an unknown risk (put option), and that ITM options contain a 
shift of a portion of the symmetric benefits and burdens of ownership 
of the underlier. The discussion of risk in this Section indicates that 
to the extent options are asymmetric exchanges of fluctuating for 
known returns (that is, not ITM), the writer of the option will charge 
a fee. However, to the extent an option is ITM, a portion of the bene-
fits and burdens of ownership of the underlier are shifted to the party 
that would own the underlier (or an equivalent cash value) should 
the option be exercised. Therefore, in the case of an ITM call, one 
would expect the risk premium a call writer receives respecting the 
non-ITM portion of the option to be offset by the risk premium the 
option holder receives respecting the ITM portion, since the ITM por-
tion involves an assumption of both opportunity and risk. In other 
words, observed risk premiums for calls should reach a maximum 
when the strike price is ATM on the option sale date and then decline 
rapidly for strike prices on the option sale date that are deeper ITM. 
Indeed, the net risk premium should shift in the direction of the call 
purchaser once the purchaser is bearing more than half the risk of 
ownership of the underlier–in other words, well before the strike 
price reaches zero, which is simply a prepaid forward contract. 
 A similar though less dramatic phenomenon should be observable 
in the case of a put option. The risk premium reaches its maximum 
when the option is sold ATM. For put options sold ITM, no additional 
risk premium is collected. Consequently, the portion of the option 
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premium attributable to the ITM portion should not reflect any addi-
tional charge to assume risk. 
C.   Conclusion 
 Any covered option represents a separation of at least some of the 
risks of ownership of the underlier from some of the benefits of own-
ership. The extent of separation reaches a maximum when the strike 
price of the option is equal to the forward price of the underlier on 
the exercise date—that is, when it is ATM as measured on the exer-
cise date. For options sold out of the money on the option purchase 
date, less separation occurs. For options sold in the money on the op-
tion purchase date, less separation also occurs than in an ATM op-
tion, but there is an additional forward property disposition. The 
payment arrangement obscures the forward property disposition be-
cause the arrangement makes the ITM portion of the option premium 
appear as consideration for additional “optionality,” when in fact the 
arrangement is merely a timing mechanism. 
 Once the forward element of an ITM option becomes manifest, it 
becomes clear that the most apt analogy of an option to an existing 
instrument is to a partnership. Partnerships commonly exhibit the 
kind of sequential ownership involved in an ITM option. Indeed, 
Bruce Kayle has noted the substantial affinity between a call option 
and certain partnership arrangements, though he does not develop 
the point.110 Rather, he illustrates the idea through a simple com-
parison. He notes that the owner of income-producing property 
(Partner 1) can contribute it to a newly formed partnership in ex-
change for cash and a partnership interest that entitles the partner 
to X% of the income from the property over time and to Y% of the ap-
preciation of the property, if any, after five years, at which time the 
partnership will sell the property. Another person (Partner 2) would 
then contribute cash to the partnership in exchange for a partnership 
interest that entitles the partner to the remaining 100%-X% of the 
income and to 100%-Y% of the appreciation on sale.111 Kayle observes 
that the partnership arrangement just described is not very different 
from Partner 1’s sale to Partner 2 of an income interest and a sepa-
rate option to purchase a portion of the property in five years.112
Kayle’s point is that the sequential nature of ownership characteris-
tic of certain option transactions is just the sort of sharing arrange-
ment commonly found in partnerships. That point is corroborated by 
the analysis above, which demonstrates that ITM options involve a 
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kind of sequential sharing of ownership of the underlier. One party 
bears the first X% of risk and benefit, and the other party the re-
mainder, though there is additionally an OTM option that then sepa-
rates risk from benefit. 
 Finally, the discussion in this Part explains the essential similari-
ty between the forward sale portion of an ITM option and a collar. 
The only difference is in the identities of the persons holding the var-
ious interests in the underlier. In a collar, the original owner parts 
with risks and benefits at a remove from the forward price and re-
tains the risks and benefits immediately surrounding the forward 
price, while in the forward sale portion of an ITM option the opposite 
occurs:  the original owner parts with the risks and benefits imme-
diately surrounding the forward price and retains the risks and bene-
fits at a remove. As a consequence, the parties end up in the opposite 
posture, but the nature of the division of ownership is identical. This 
identity is obscured not only by the payment arrangement in an ITM 
option but by the fact that the ITM property disposition is married to 
a genuine option purchase in which one of the tails is also sold—
through either an offloading of downside risk or the purchase of float-
ing benefit, in either case in exchange for a fixed payment. 
IV.   TAX ANALYSIS
 This Part evaluates the tax rules that ought to apply to options in 
light of the analysis in Part III. Because of the realization rule and 
the special treatment that the tax law affords to capital assets,113 two 
basic cases arise: where the party selling upside potential (call writ-
er) or purchasing downside protection (put purchaser) owns the un-
derlier (a covered option), and where the underlier serves merely as a 
reference obligation for the option writer and holder. The first case 
divides into two subcases: where the underlier is held by the relevant 
party at all times between the option sale date and the exercise date, 
and where it is not, which is akin to a short sale. Subpart A deals 
with the cases involving ownership of the underlier, and Subpart B 
deals with those in which the underlier serves as a reference obliga-
tion. Finally, Subpart C explores some of the approaches that might 
be adopted under current law, or with some variation to current law, 
in light of the tax analysis that would apply under basic tax prin-
ciples as developed in Subparts A and B. 
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A.   Underlier Owned 
 In this Subpart, assume that the put purchaser or the call seller 
owns the underlier on the exercise date. In Section 1, ownership 
commences no later than the option sale date, while in Section 2, the 
consequences of the holder’s acquisition of the underlier after the op-
tion sale but prior to the exercise date are briefly considered. 
Throughout, basic income tax principles are applied without regard 
to either special statutory and regulatory rules that provide for con-
trary treatment or questions of tax administration. Thus, disposi-
tions of equity are taxable as realization events;114 services income is 
taxed on receipt,115 subject to certain limited exceptions;116 and time 
value of money income accrues on a constant yield-to-maturity basis 
with continuous compounding.117
 The principal tax question raised for any covered option is wheth-
er the option sale is in whole or part a capital transaction, and that 
question depends in turn on whether and to what extent the transac-
tion is a property transaction.118 In the financial instruments context, 
if it is a property transaction, it is likely to be capital,119 unless the 
option is stock in trade or inventory of the taxpayer120 or is a hedge 
with respect to stock in trade or inventory.121 Capital transactions 
generally are treated much differently from noncapital transactions 
under the Code. Capital gains and losses are netted,122 capital losses 
generally may not be deducted against ordinary income except to a 
limited extent,123 and long-term capital gains of individual taxpayers 
are taxed at favorable rates.124 Further, income from capital transac-
tions generally is not registered by the tax system until realized.125
By contrast, ordinary income is subject to graduated rates;126 may be 
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subject to an accrual or other regime that accounts for income on an 
on-going basis, regardless of when it is realized;127 and may, in the 
case of losses, offset capital and ordinary income.128
 Yet, although the concepts of “capital income” and “ordinary in-
come” are deeply rooted in the income tax, most commentators agree 
that there is no pure concept of either that permits a ready or cogent 
argument for characterizing any particular item as intrinsically one 
or the other.129 Modern finance theory has long recognized that any 
“ordinary” payment stream can be discounted into a present fixed 
“capital” sum. Given the economic equivalence between the two, ef-
forts to identify a principled basis for determining which side of the 
line a transaction should fall on when the transaction shares some 
characteristics of both seems largely pointless.130 Rather, a better ap-
proach is probably functional: Which characterization best serves the 
goals of the income tax? In light of the favorable treatment of capital 
income and the general preference to limit that treatment rather 
than to make it widely available, the better approach inclines toward 
ordinary characterization in ambiguous cases, unless a reason for a 
different result is manifest. Accordingly, in this discussion, capital 
treatment is reserved for gain or loss realized from the disposition of 
property, where property ownership is understood in its standard tax 
sense of possessing the opportunity for gain and the correlative risk 
of loss with respect to some item. Transactions involving the disposi-
tion of either just the opportunity for gain or just the risk of loss are 
not property transactions but are, instead, “legs” of a property trans-
action. Sale of an OTM option is one such leg, and if the option is ex-
ercised, transfer of the other leg occurs as well, meaning that a prop-
erty transaction has occurred. If the OTM option is not exercised, 
then the initial leg is undone and no property disposition occurs. 
Consequently, capital treatment for the disposition that occurs on the 
option sale date of an OTM option (or more accurately to the extent 
the option is OTM) seems inapposite. 
 In an ITM option, by contrast, there is, in addition to an OTM op-
tion a property disposition of a portion of the underlier. This occurs 
because the transfer of benefits and correlative burdens in the ITM 
portion of the option is paradigmatic of a property disposition. There-
fore, a tax system that reaches the “right” answer in the sense that it 
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reserves capital treatment for disposition of all and only capital as-
sets in any option transaction would tax the ITM portion, if any, as a 
capital transaction, assuming the underlier was a capital asset in the 
relevant party’s hands. 
1.   Ownership Throughout the Option Term 
 Under the analysis in Part III, every option involves an asymme-
tric division of ownership of the benefits and burdens of the underlier 
to the extent it is non-ITM. This asymmetric division seems to bear 
some attributes of a property transfer and some attributes of a non-
property transfer. Separately, ITM options involve a symmetrical 
transfer of benefits and burdens that more closely resembles a for-
ward property disposition. The following Subsections address these 
aspects of option transactions. 
a.   Non-ITM Option 
 Part III established that a non-ITM option in effect divides owner-
ship of the underlier between the option holder and the option writer. 
The transaction is not capital in the traditional sense because it is 
not a transfer of property, but a peculiar sort of sharing arrangement 
in which the option holder retains or acquires certain benefits but not 
detriments, while the writer acquires or retains certain detriments 
but not benefits. Together, the two parties have all the indicia of 
ownership but separately neither does for any range of values cov-
ered by the option. The full consequences of a disposition of the un-
derlier to a third party would be borne just as they are borne by an 
owner, but these consequences would be divided unequally between 
the writer and the holder. 
 Viewed from this perspective, the non-ITM option premium is a 
fee that the holder pays for the writer to accept the adverse conse-
quences of ownership. It is a prepayment for the service of bearing 
the risk of property ownership without the associated benefit on the 
exercise date. In general, prepayments not for a capital asset are sub-
ject to immediate taxation, unless an exception applies.131 Apart from 
narrow statutory exceptions for certain types of subscription in-
come132 and club dues,133 the only exceptions to immediate inclusion 
of prepaid services income are for an accrual-method taxpayer that 
either satisfies the requirements for administratively granted safe 
harbor relief (not here applicable)134 or can reliably associate the pre-
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paid item with an obligation to be discharged for a relatively certain 
amount in a readily identifiable subsequent tax period.135 Because of 
the contingency of the obligation that an option writer assumes, the 
latter exception does not apply either, leading to immediate inclu-
sion. Although a better theoretical result would be to defer inclusion 
(and any associated deduction) until the period of exercise or lapse 
and to treat the option premium as a loan, requiring immediate in-
clusion instead without any deemed interest or expense on the loan 
may not be a bad proxy for taxation of the holder’s interest and the 
writer’s associated deduction on a deemed loan.136
 The holder should enjoy mirror treatment. Assuming the option is 
entered into in connection with the taxpayer’s trade or business or 
other income-producing activity, the premium should be deductible 
as, respectively, a business expense137 or an expense incurred in con-
nection with the production of income.138 The deduction should be al-
lowed in the period in which the exercise date (or, for the reasons 
stated previously, the last date of the exercise period) occurs.139
 If the non-ITM option is exercised, the second “leg” of the property 
disposition occurs, and at this point it is appropriate to treat the total 
transaction (option sale plus exercise) as a property disposition. This 
treatment is correct because the original owner of the property has 
now parted with the benefits and the associated burdens of ownership. 
Consider the simple OTM put option described as part of Transaction 
2, under which Owner paid Purchaser $3.00 on Day 1 for the right to 
put Underlier to Purchaser on Day 2 for $97.94.140 Suppose Owner ex-
ercises; i.e., Underlier is not worth more than $97.94 on Day 2. Solely 
with respect to the OTM portion of Transaction 2 (and assuming here 
that the associated ITM portion of the option had not been entered in-
to), on Day 1, Owner transferred the risk of loss below $97.94 to Pur-
chaser. Owner retained the risk of loss down to $97.94 as well as the 
potential for upside gain. On Day 2, Owner bears the loss from $100 to 
$97.94 and transfers all potential for upside gain to Purchaser. Al-
though the property transfer appears to be off-market (in that the 
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property appears to change hands on Day 2 at a price that differs from 
its FMV on that day), this is merely an appearance. The transfer of 
possession is a formality. The actual transfer of benefits and burdens 
took place in two steps—on Day 1 when some of the risk of loss shifted, 
and on Day 2 when the opportunity for gain went over as well. The two 
transfers, together, are on-market. 
 If the option lapses, the originally transferred leg is transferred 
back and no property disposition occurs. For instance, if Underlier in 
the example above is worth any amount greater than $97.94 on Day 
2, the loss below $97.94 on Day 2 is zero. 
b.   ITM Option 
 For an ITM option, the analysis is more complicated. On the op-
tion sale date there is, in addition to a separation of some of the bene-
fits of ownership of the underlier from some of the associated bur-
dens, an on-market forward disposition of a portion of the underlier. 
This portion of the option sale, therefore, should be treated as a for-
ward of a certain sort. Perhaps unfortunately, under current law, 
forwards are generally held open,141 subject to certain exceptions,142
until the actual transfer of the property takes place. Open transac-
tion treatment for forwards when the seller owns the underlier seems 
even less justifiable than open transaction treatment for options. In a 
forward, all the seller retains is a wasting present interest—the val-
ue of which is known on the sale date. With respect to the portion 
sold, full transfer of benefits and burdens has occurred. Conse-
quently, and as a number of commentators have observed,143 a cur-
rent sale of future rights should be accounted for currently even un-
der our realization-based income tax. If forwards were currently 
taxed, then the ITM portion of an ITM option should be treated as a 
taxable transaction when the option is sold. 
 Naturally, the introduction of separate treatment for the property 
disposition portion of an ITM option introduces complexity into the 
tax rules for options. Moreover, the complexity is compounded by the 
fact that the property disposition in an ITM option is of a peculiar 
sort. It is not the disposition of a physical portion, a ratable portion, 
or a temporal portion of the underlier, but rather of a risk portion. 
For each of the first three types of division, the tax rules are relative-
ly straightforward, at least in conceptual terms. If, for example, the 
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owner of a share of stock sells a fraction of the share, the extent of 
the risk and benefit in the underlier that the purchaser acquires is 
proportional to the fraction purchased. Thus, the purchaser of one-
half the share would assume a risk of loss equal to 50% of the risk 
associated with the full underlier and acquire the correlative poten-
tial benefit.144 The same result applies to cotenants that share an un-
divided interest in real property.145 Similarly, a temporal division of 
the underlier results, in conceptual terms, in the creation of a wast-
ing present interest and a growing future interest. The tax rules for 
such property dispositions can be complicated, but the underlying 
conceptual analysis is well understood.146
 By contrast, in an ITM option, the transfer of partial ownership in 
the underlier is sequential, or “horizontal.” The parties do not share 
risk and reward ratably or in temporal succession but rather in 
risk/benefit sequence. If the ITM portion of the option represents a 
forward sale of X% of the underlier, then the transferee assumes the 
first X% of risk and reward, while the transferor retains the remain-
ing (100 – X)%, which is distributed about the transferred portion. 
This division suggests that the transferor should be viewed as dispos-
ing of property “off the top,” in that the portion disposed of is the por-
tion that is first and exclusively affected by price fluctuations in the 
underlier. Once the division occurs, post-option sale fluctuations in 
the value of the underlier that do not exceed the range of risk and 
benefit transferred have no economic effect on the transferor. This 
means that the transferor has no economic stake in those fluctua-
tions. At the same time, price fluctuations that do exceed the range 
have no (additional) effect on the transferee, meaning that the trans-
feree has no stake in them. 
 These considerations indicate that the transferor’s tax basis in the 
portion of the underlier sold forward should be allocated only to the ex-
tent that it falls within the actual price range of that portion on the op-
tion sale date. If the transferor’s basis does not fall within that range, 
the transferor has no tax cost associated with the disposition at all, 
and therefore no basis should be allocated to offset the proceeds. This 
approach tends to result in a more certain but smaller recognition of 
gain or loss on disposition than would a ratable allocation rule. 
 Transaction 4, discussed previously, illustrates the basic analysis:  
Transaction 4:  ITM put option. Owner pays Purchaser 
$5.27 on Day 1 in exchange for the right to sell Underlier to 
                                                                                                                    
 144. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.616 (2009) (providing basis rules for partial dispositions of property). 
 145. Id. 
 146. See, e.g., Kenneth F. Joyce & Louis A. Del Cotto, The AB (ABC) and BA Transac-
tions: An Economic and Tax Analysis of Reserved and Carved Out Income Interests, 31 TAX
L. REV. 121 (1976). 
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Purchaser on Day 2 for $102.27. The parties cash-settle the 
obligation on Day 2.  
Transaction 4 consists of an OTM put having a strike price of $97.94 
and a prepaid, on-market disposition of the first 25% of opportunity 
for gain and risk of loss of Underlier, corresponding to the range of 
values on Day 2 between $97.94 and $102.27. In the transaction, the 
risk-free rate was assumed to be zero, no risk premium was paid, and 
Underlier’s FMV on Day 1 was $100. 
 If we suppose that Owner’s basis is anything less than $97.94, 
then under the theory that basis should be allocated to the disposi-
tion only to the extent Owner has basis over the disposed of range, 
Owner should be treated as recognizing $100 - $97.94, or $2.06, of 
gain. Thus, if Owner’s basis is $80, Owner has $2.06 of gain. By con-
trast, if Owner’s basis is $98, Owner has $2 of gain. 
 One might object that if Owner has basis in excess of 75% of the 
Underlier’s FMV, Owner should get a partial basis offset on the op-
tion sale date because only 25% of Underlier is sold. Thus, if Owner’s 
basis is $80, it might seem Owner should recognize four-fifths 
($80/$100) of $2.06, rather than the full $2.06. However, because the 
sale is not of a ratable portion but of an identifiable horizontal slice, 
and because the risk and benefit disposed of is associated only with 
that slice, a ratable basis allocation rule would seem to be incorrect; 
it does not associate “paid-for” basis with a “paid-for” portion of the 
underlier sold. Note further that although less basis offset occurs 
than in a ratable disposition, the amount of gain recognized on the 
option sale date is smaller. Although Owner has disposed of 25% of 
the opportunity for gain and risk of loss and Owner allocates no basis 
to the portion sold, Owner’s gain is $2.06 rather than 25% of the en-
tire $25 of built-in gain, or $6.25. 
 Analogous treatment occurs where Owner is in a loss position. 
Owner may take a loss equal to the lesser of $102.27 - $100 or Own-
er’s basis in Underlier - $100. This treatment reflects the fact that, 
solely with respect to the ITM portion of the option, Owner has dis-
posed of tax ownership through that range but not above or below it. 
 If the option is exercised, the retained portion of Underlier is simply 
transferred pursuant to the exercise, as described above in the OTM 
case. If the option is not exercised, the sold portion is deemed repur-
chased at its FMV and Owner’s basis in that portion simply reflects 
the part of the option premium paid on Day 1 that is allocable to it. 
2.   Ownership Acquired After Option Sale 
 Under the analysis developed in Part III, only ITM options involve 
a property transfer prior to the exercise date. All options, however, 
involve a risk-benefit disaggregation transaction on the option sale 
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date, together with a reunification on the exercise date of the parts 
previously separated. If the option is exercised, the “trailing” leg that 
the initial owner (the put seller or call writer) retained goes over to 
the property purchaser, while if the option is not exercised, the “lead-
ing” leg that the initial owner transferred is returned to that owner. 
Since the non-ITM portion does not involve a property disposition, 
the ownership of the underlier prior to the exercise date is irrelevant. 
Gain or loss on exercise of the option will continue to be determined 
by the difference between exercise price and basis of the underlier 
and its basis in the owner’s hands, whether that basis was deter-
mined after the option sale date (because the underlier was pur-
chased after that date) or not. 
 A similar approach should apply to the ITM portion, if any, of an 
option where the underlier is acquired after the option sale date. 
There are two cases in which acquisition of the underlier during the 
pendency of the option may have an effect on the tax treatment of the 
transaction prior to exercise: where the purchaser of an ITM put and 
the seller of an ITM call acquire the underlier. Recall that for both 
types of ITM options, on the option sale date the underlier seller 
promises to deliver a portion of the underlier (or its equivalent) to the 
counter-party on the exercise date. Prior to the seller’s purchase of 
the underlier, there should be no tax consequence to the disposition. 
Under a realization-based income tax, the tax consequences of enter-
ing into the option transaction should first be reckoned on the option 
sale date when the forward transfer occurs. On that date, the ex-
pected cost of satisfying the transfer is zero:  the seller conceptually 
exchanges a portion of the underlier for a bond of equal value paying 
the risk-free rate. The expected cost to the seller on the option sale 
date of satisfying that obligation is just the FMV of the portion of the 
underlier sold forward, since that is what the seller would have to 
pay on the option sale date to procure the portion sold forward. 
 Once the seller acquires the underlier, additional tax conse-
quences of the sale may be reckoned. At that time, the seller’s cost of 
satisfying its obligation under the forward sale portion of the option 
is established. For example, consider the ITM put option in Transac-
tion 4, but assume that Owner does not own Underlier on the option 
sale date. If Owner purchases Underlier at $90 six months after the 
option sale date, then Owner’s cost of delivering 25% of Underlier on 
Day 2 is $0 because the portion of the underlier disposed of in the 
ITM piece of the option is entirely in excess of the cost to Owner of 
acquiring the property. 
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B.   Underlier as Reference Obligation 
 If the parties to the option transaction use the underlier merely as 
a reference obligation, the transaction becomes a simple bet. It is a 
zero-sum game in which one party’s gain is precisely offset by the 
counter-party’s loss.147 In recent years, the tax law has tended to 
treat such bets as generating capital income and loss because of the 
risky nature of the returns they generate,148 but there appears to be 
no deep reason why the returns should not be characterized as ordi-
nary and subject to an economic accrual or similar regime, such as 
mark-to-market taxation.149 There is no particular historical 
precedent for according capital treatment to returns just because 
they are risk-based, and the policy rationales for deferral and favora-
ble rates on capital income do not seem to apply to bets. In general, 
these rationales center on encouraging the formation of real capital 
and avoiding the bunching of income in a single tax year that arises 
under the realization rule. Wagers do not involve the formation of 
physical capital, and bunching becomes a problem only where an ac-
crual regime is assumed not to be in place. 
 If, however, capital treatment of traditional capital assets (such as 
where the option involves a physical underlier) is taken as a given, 
then the tax rules for wagering-type options should take account of 
the avoidance possibilities that dissimilar rules for physical and no-
tional options would create.150 The avoidance possibilities derive from 
two main problems: discontinuity and inconsistency. Discontinuity 
arises when instruments that generate similar returns are subject to 
dissimilar tax rules;151 the general solution is to tax similar instru-
ments like their close substitutes.152 Inconsistency arises when the 
same return is taxed differently, depending upon the form in which it 
is received;153 the general solution is to adopt a robust method for 
                                                                                                                    
 147. See Edward D. Kleinbard, Risky and Riskless Positions in Securities, 71 TAXES
783, 784 (1993). 
 148. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 1234A (2006) (treating certain “closing transactions” as gene-
rating short-term capital gain and loss); 26 C.F.R. § 1.446-3(c) (2010) (bullet swap not 
treated as subject to NPC rules). 
 149. See Keinan, supra note 8, at 146 (arguing that all returns from financial instru-
ments should be treated as ordinary and subject to taxation on an accrual or mark-to-
market basis); Hasen, supra note 13, at 403-07 (arguing that a better basis for distinguish-
ing between returns entitled to capital treatment, including deferral under the realization 
rule, and ordinary returns accounted for under an economic accrual regime is whether the 
taxpayer owns a physical underlier); see also Kleinbard, supra note 147, at 784 (noting that 
financial products differ from traditional capital assets in that the former are simple bets 
that can be replicated in principle indefinitely). 
 150. David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing in the Tax Law, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1627 (1999). 
 151. Jeff Strnad, Taxing New Financial Products: A Conceptual Framework, 46 Stan. 
L. Rev. 569, 573 (1994). 
 152. Weisbach, supra note 150, at 1661. 
 153. Id. at 1645. 
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identifying the overall economic return the taxpayer locks in ex ante,
but the problems with developing such methods are notorious.154 The 
problem in the present context is that from the standpoint of either 
the writer or the holder of the option, the returns from the bet may 
be similar to the returns from a physically settled option. According-
ly, the rules ought to be similar for the two types of transactions. 
Further, the rules need to require taxpayers to associate offsetting 
positions, such as where the taxpayer buys an option in one form and 
sells a similar or identical one in another. How the rules might ac-
complish these goals falls outside the scope of this discussion; I mere-
ly identify the issues here. 
C.   Possible Tax Approaches 
 The rules described in the preceding Subparts suffer from  
both complexity and the fact that they diverge considerably from cur-
rent law. The question therefore arises how one might simplify  
the rules suggested without either sacrificing the basic ideas or in-
troducing major complexity into current law. The following offers 
some general suggestions. 
1.   Basic Problems Under Current Law 
 The principal authorities that govern the taxation of options are 
Revenue Ruling 78-182155 and, for options on financial assets (other 
than those taxed under § 1256, or held as inventory or by dealers), §§ 
1234 and 1234A. In general, these authorities provide for open trans-
action treatment on the writing of an option and for capital treat-
ment on sale, exchange, lapse, termination, or exercise of the option 
if the underlier is or would be a capital asset in the taxpayer’s hands. 
When the option is exercised, in the case of a call the cost of the op-
tion is added to the purchaser’s basis and treated as part of the 
amount realized by the seller, and the cost of a put is treated as a re-
duction in the amount realized by the seller and as reducing the pur-
chaser’s basis in the property. There is some question whether any of 
these authorities apply to options that by their terms are or may be 
cash-settled. 
 The main differences between these rules and the rules set forth 
in Subparts III.A and III.B are as follows: 
1. Existing law places most options on open-transaction ac-
counting; 
                                                                                                                    
 154. Id. at 1663.
 155. Rev. Rul. 78-182, 1978-1 C.B. 265. 
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2. Existing law treats all portions of the option premium as 
capital (assuming the underlier is a capital asset in the 
hands of the relevant party), whereas the preceding discus-
sion suggests that the option premium, to the extent it is for 
an OTM option, is ordinary income to the option writer (and 
creates an ordinary expense to the option purchaser); 
3. No interest income or deduction is imputed to the parties 
to an option under present law, whereas economically all 
parts of the option premium are discounted to the present 
value of the premium payment on the exercise date; and 
4. The nonproperty portion of an option transaction is not 
separately treated from the property portion. 
 The first of these differences is the most significant because it 
represents a significant deferral opportunity in light of the fact that 
many parties to option transactions may be tax-indifferent, or at 
least relatively tax-indifferent.156 The simple solution is to treat op-
tion premiums as generating ordinary income to the writer and as 
providing a deduction to the purchaser in the period in which the 
strike date (or the last strike date for American options) occurs. Re-
garding timing, this change to the law could be accomplished admini-
stratively through the revocation of Revenue Ruling 78-182, except 
that it is unclear whether the Service would or should revoke 78-182 
in light of Congress’s evident intent to affirm open transaction 
treatment through adoption of §§ 1234 and 1234A. Further, charac-
ter changes would need to be addressed through amendment of §§ 
1234 and 1234A directly. 
 If one wanted to rectify the problem of mixed ordinary and capital 
treatment of the premium, it would be necessary for Congress to re-
move the statutory obstacles to bifurcation (again, §§ 1234 and 
1234A). Having done that, the Treasury likely would have authority 
to require bifurcation of the option into capital and noncapital por-
tions on the option sale date and to require separate accounting of 
the various pieces of the option payout on the date of exercise, lapse, 
or disposition.157 This might or might not prove burdensome, but the 
fact that parties dealing in financial options tend to be sophisticated 
weighs in favor of a relatively robust accounting regime, possibly 
                                                                                                                    
 156. See David M. Schizer, Balance in the Taxation of Derivative Securities: An Agenda 
for Reform, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1886, 1893-94 (2004). 
 157. See 26 U.S.C. § 446 (2006) (requiring taxpayer’s method of accounting to “clearly 
reflect income”); 26 U.S.C. § 7805 (providing Treasury general authority to prescribe regu-
lations under Title 26). 
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augmented by a simplified accounting method that taxpayers could 
elect to have apply.158
 As regards the problem of failing to account for interest, one could 
impute interest income and deduction to the parties on the option 
premium. It is not clear that any provision of current law prevents 
such an imputation. A somewhat less accurate but administratively 
easier approach would be to treat payment of the option premium as 
a closed transaction on the option sale date, as indicated above. 
 Finally, the failure to tax the ITM portion of an option on the op-
tion sale date mainly becomes an issue only if forwards become sub-
ject to current taxation, as a number of commentators have argued 
they should.159 If forwards were taxed on a current basis, it would be 
appropriate if not necessary given the similarity of the ITM portion of 
ITM options to forwards to alter the rules for options to require iden-
tification of the ITM portion, if any, with associated treatment under 
the forward contract rules. By the same token, it is unclear how 
much would be sacrificed on the option side in preserving open 
transaction treatment for both standard forwards and the ITM por-
tion of an option. If the distortion is small, the gain in simplicity may 
be worth the cost of incorrect taxation. Of course, that result would 
preserve whatever distortions persist as a result of the system’s fail-
ure to tax forwards correctly. 
 A further, less significant, problem resulting from the failure to 
tax the ITM portion of an option as a forward on the option sale date 
is that the current rules do not treat any portion of the option sale as 
taxable if the option is not exercised. The analysis here has demon-
strated, however, that economically the owner of the underlier should 
be taxed on the forward portion of the ITM option regardless of 
whether the option is exercised. Nonexercise should be treated as a 
sale back to the option writer, resulting in appropriate basis adjust-
ment, not as though no sale had occurred. 
2.   Proposals 
 The discussion above suggests the following rules as a possible re-
gime for taxing financial options. 
a.   Option Sale Date 
? To the extent the option is OTM, the writer includes the 
premium in income. The holder takes a deduction under § 
162 or 212 for the premium in the period in which or with 
                                                                                                                    
 158. See, e.g., Prop. 26 C.F.R. § 1.446-3(e) (proposing a variety of methods to account 
for nonperiodic contingent payments made on certain NPCs). 
 159. See supra Part III.A. 
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which ends the last day that the option may be exercised, 
subject to any limitations that may apply.160
? To the extent, if any, the option is ITM, the parties treat 
the premium as a loan or a prepayment. The reason for dif-
fering treatment from the OTM piece is that this portion of 
the premium is nothing more than a payment arrangement 
for the fluctuation in the part of the underlier sold forward. 
Interest is imputed to the option holder at the risk-free rate, 
with a corresponding deduction to the option writer. Alter-
natively, the premium could be included and deducted on re-
ceipt, with corresponding adjustments on exercise. 
? For an ITM option, the portion of the option that 
represents a forward sale is treated as such on the option 
sale date, with gain or loss recognized on that date. This 
rule presupposes that the rules for forwards are changed to 
provide for taxation on the sale date rather than on the date 
of delivery. 
o As an alternative, the forward may be held open until 
the exercise date, in which case the deemed purchase 
price must include an interest factor. Further, on lapse, 
the portion sold forward is treated as immediately  
sold back. 
b.   Option Exercise 
? For non-ITM options, the transaction is a sale at the exer-
cise price, with gain or loss recognized. Character depends on 
whether the seller of the property holds it as a capital asset. 
o A policy question arises regarding the measuring pe-
riod for the underlier owner. Where the seller’s holding 
period on the option sale date is one year or less and on 
the exercise date is more than one year, it is unclear 
whether gain or loss on exercise should be short-term or 
long-term.161 As explained above, the sale in effect oc-
curs in two stages. Administrability considerations sug-
gest that a bifurcation regime should not apply, while 
the general policy of limiting the preferential treatment 
of capital transactions suggests that the gain or loss 
should be short-term. On the other hand, there may be 
                                                                                                                    
 160. See, e.g., §§ 68 (phase-out of itemized deductions), 161 (denying double deduction 
for any item), 261 (disallowance of deductions for expenditures that must be capitalized). 
 161. See 26 U.S.C. § 1(h) (2006) (providing for preferential treatment of long-term capi-
tal gains for individuals); 26 U.S.C. § 1222 (defining long-term capital gains as gains on 
capital assets held more than one year); 26 U.S.C. § 1223 (defining holding period). 
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greater deadweight loss from denying long-term capital 
treatment in this setting than from permitting it. The 
correct answer is not clear. 
? For ITM options, exercise represents a sale of the balance 
of the underlier, but taking account of basis already as-
signed to the portion sold forward on the option sale date. 
c.   Option Lapse or Cancellation 
? On a non-ITM option, there are no consequences on lapse 
other than deduction for the premium, if it has not already 
been deducted. 
? On an ITM option, the property previously treated as sold 
forward is treated as sold back; if it was held open on the op-
tion sale date, a sale and sale-back occur. 
V.   CONCLUSION
 Options represent nothing more than a particular type of property 
division. They are not spatial, as when a party sells a physical piece 
of a larger asset, temporal, as when a party sells a leasehold or a re-
mainder interest in an asset, or “vertical,” as when a party sells a 
ratable share of property so that the two owners share risk and re-
ward as tenants in common. In their pure form, options are a division 
of risk and reward for which the party bearing the risk without the 
reward is appropriately compensated. In addition, ITM options be-
come, in part, a horizontal or sequential transfer of ownership, much 
as may occur in a partnership. This horizontal form of ownership di-
vides the incidents of ownership according to who bears the first risk 
and benefit, and who bears the rest. As previously explained, the 
ITM portion is identical to a collar transaction, except that in a collar 
the original property owner retains the first risk and benefit while 
selling the last; while in the ITM portion of an ITM option, the origi-
nal owner retains the last and sells the first. 
 The forward transfer of property that takes place in the ITM por-
tion, if any, of an option has not been identified previously because the 
payment arrangement between the parties to an option transaction 
obscures it. This payment arrangement ensures that the option pur-
chaser makes only one payment to the option seller (apart from a 
payment in connection with the exercise of a call), and it reflects ap-
propriate discounting at the risk-free rate because the payment occurs 
on the option sale date, not the exercise date. But the payout structure 
of any actual ITM option is identical to the payout structure associated 
with a forward transfer of a portion of the underlier coupled with a 
garden-variety OTM option. This structure explains why, even though 
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non-ITM options are fundamentally different from forward sales as re-
gards the portion of property disposed of, ITM options become partial 
forwards and shade into full forwards at the limit. 
 Our realization-based income tax recognizes a difference between 
“ordinary” and “capital” income—however tenuous or unstable the un-
derlying concepts may be. In light of the difference, and assuming it 
persists, the tax system ought to attempt to identify the portions of op-
tion transactions that qualify as ordinary or capital and tax them ac-
cordingly, assuming that administrative costs resulting from complexi-
ty and gamesmanship do not swamp the benefits that might arise from 
a more accurate taxation of options. Part III offers one set of possible 
solutions in light of these concerns, but it is by no means the only poss-
ible set. It also illustrates some of the tradeoffs that arise in any effort 
to develop a workable system that taxes options in approximately the 
“correct” manner, where “correct” is understood against a baseline of 
realization-based taxation for risky returns generated by capital and 
special rates and basketing rules for capital income. 
